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STATE ACTION PROBLEMS 
Christian Turner

 
Abstract 
The state action doctrine is a mess. Explanations for why federal 
courts sometimes treat the private actions of private parties as public 
actions subject to the Constitution, as the Supreme Court did in Shelley 
v. Kraemer, are either vastly over-inclusive or fail to explain our law 
and values. A better approach is to understand the state action doctrine 
in institutional terms. I introduce a two-step, institutionally focused state 
action theory that is a natural consequence of a broader public–private 
theory of legal systems. In the first step, a court identifies a ―state action 
problem,‖ meaning a privately made law that is poorly governed by the 
ordinary rules governing the making of contracts. If a court finds a state 
action problem, it proceeds to the second step and decides whether 
courts have superior capacity to remedy the problem than do other 
governmental institutions. This theory captures important intuitions 
about the public regulation of private lawmaking that other approaches 
either ignore or fail to ground theoretically. In addition, it helps to 
justify why racial discrimination is often a decisive fact in finding state 
action, explains why the doctrine is rarely invoked, and provides a firm, 
theoretical foundation for a doctrine otherwise adrift in search of 
guiding principles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Was Shelley v. Kraemer correctly decided?
1
 The Constitution plainly 
prohibits states from imposing racially discriminatory laws, but does it 
forbid private parties from entering discriminatory covenants? Answer 
yes, and one needs to explain why a rule addressed to states should 
constrain agreements between private individuals—and why it does not 
apply to all private conduct. Answer no, and the task becomes justifying 
inaction in the face of entrenched, private apartheid. Our dinner 
invitations, marriage proposals, and even business ventures certainly 
must be immune to at least some of the constitutional law that requires 
public actors to afford equal treatment, due process, and respect for all 
viewpoints. At the same time, widespread, private racism can lead to an 
unequal, caste-like society as surely as statutes commanding it be so. 
In Shelley, the Supreme Court chose the path of action, deciding that 
it was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for Missouri courts to 
enforce racially discriminatory private covenants, no matter the 
covenants‘ apparent compliance with state law and the inapplicability of 
any federal statute.
2
 The enforcement by public courts was the ―state 
action‖ that the Constitution regulated and found wanting. But if the 
substance of a private agreement is constrained by the Constitution 
merely because a court enforces the agreement, then there is no area of 
private contract law left unregulated by the Constitution. Every private 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 2. Id. at 19–23. 
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actor is subject to the constraints on public actors.
3
 And yet, if private 
actors are never subject to constitutional regulation, then powerful 
coalitions of private individuals are free to use their coercive capacity to 
create, for example, a de facto system of racist zoning. Shelley must be 
wrong, and yet it must be right. 
Take another case turning on the presence of state action: May a 
corporation forcibly eject a religious speaker from streets the 
corporation owns in a town the corporation owns because it wishes to 
suppress such speech? Again, private citizens violate each other‘s free 
speech rights all the time, choosing associates and houseguests on the 
basis of social, political, or religious viewpoints. Only the State is 
constitutionally prohibited from discriminating in this way. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, in Marsh v. Alabama, decided that a 
company that owns an entire town must allow speakers to exercise the 
speech rights they would have in an ordinary, publicly owned town.
4
 Of 
course, racially discriminatory covenants and company-owned towns 
are not the only private spheres in which the state action question is 
problematic. From privately operated political primaries to protests at 
large shopping malls, some of the most puzzling cases in our 
constitutional law turn on whether private entities ought to be treated as 
if they were an arm of the State. 
A principle that explains or refutes these decisions has proved 
elusive. The line of state action opinions has been criticized as 
incoherent, ungrounded, and insincere. The Supreme Court itself has 
acknowledged that the ―cases deciding when private action might be 
deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency.‖5 
Vikram Amar has more candidly stated that ―[i]t might be fair to call the 
area a mess.‖6 I would go further. It is a mess. 
Why are these cases difficult? Why depart at all from using an 
actor‘s formal status as a rule-like state action threshold? Why is a more 
flexible state action doctrine, such as the one we have, desirable and yet 
so hard to fashion? The answer to these questions lies in better 
understanding the heart of the problem, the dichotomy that is the 
bedrock of our legal system: the public–private distinction. 
                                                                                                                     
 3. See, e.g., Carol Rose, Property Stories: Shelley v. Kraemer, in PROPERTY STORIES 
169, 194 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004) (―Shelley seemed simply to assert 
that judicial enforcement of covenants is ‗state action‘; but this raises the familiar problem of 
constitutionalizing every private civil conflict that appears in court.‖). 
 4. 326 U.S. 501, 507–09 (1946). 
 5. Lebron v. Nat‘l R.R. Passenger, 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995) (quoting Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991)) (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). 
 6. Vikram David Amar, The NCAA as Regulator, Litigant, and State Actor, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 415, 416 (2011). 
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The morass of the state action doctrine is almost entirely a product of 
conflicting intuitions concerning what is public, or somehow of the 
State, and what is private, or not of the State.  
In the state action cases, the basic structure of legal systems is 
exposed, and the most essential and divisive political question—the 
proper division of authority between the collective and the individuals 
that compose it—starkly demands an answer. If undisciplined, this 
inquiry can be so uncertain that any rule that depends on identifying 
what is public, or state action, and what is private action is easily 
transformed into a vessel for the imposition of raw policy preferences. 
In response to any argument that a thing is private, one can always 
argue that it is public.  
There is, however, a better way than muddling through, one that 
helps elucidate the purposes the state action doctrine serves and the 
policies that are important when choosing how to apply it. To find it, we 
must first understand that the question is not whether a regulated entity 
is public or private in the undifferentiated abstract, but whether it 
exhibits the particular private or public characteristics at which the 
secondary rules regulating its lawmaking power are targeted.
7
  
Any legal system, whether or not based in part on a written 
constitution, maintains two bodies of law that may be characterized as 
fundamental Constitutional Law.
8
 ―Private Constitutional Law‖ 
comprises the criteria for creating and reviewing privately enacted law, 
including ordinary contracts. In our system, this includes the doctrines 
of offer and acceptance and of unconscionability. Private Constitutional 
Law responds to the stereotypical institutional difficulties of private 
lawmaking bodies, including self-interestedness. In contrast, ―public 
                                                                                                                     
 7. By secondary rules, I mean the rules that govern the creation, change, and use of the 
primary rules that govern behavior directly. As H.L.A. Hart put it:  
Under rules of the one type, which may well be considered the basic or primary 
type, human beings are required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether 
they wish to or not. Rules of the other type are in a sense parasitic upon or 
secondary to the first; for they provide that human beings may by doing or 
saying certain things introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or 
modify old ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or control their 
operations. Rules of the first type impose duties; rules of the second type confer 
powers, public or private. 
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81 (2d ed. 1994). The written U.S. Constitution governs, 
among other things, the creation and change of laws by the Congress. Its provisions related to 
legislature composition, the enactment of laws, and right-based prohibitions on the content of 
laws are all secondary rules. So too, state contract law setting forth offer and acceptance and 
other doctrines as criteria for the validity of a contract are secondary rules. See also Christian 
Turner, Law’s Public/Private Structure, 39 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1003, 1013–14(2012). 
 8. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1013–16; see also infra Part III. 
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Constitutional Law‖ governs the creation and review of publicly 
enacted law. The governance of congressional lawmaking in our own 
written Constitution is a part of this law. Public Constitutional Law, 
because it governs the making of law that will bind others without their 
consent, is responsive to the stereotypical problems of public agents. 
Viewing legal systems in this way, it becomes clear that the state 
action cases raise a kind of ―Categorization Problem,‖ a problem of 
choosing between alternative bodies of secondary rules to govern an 
institution. A legal system encounters a type of Categorization Problem 
that I call a ―state action problem‖ when the characteristics relevant to a 
formally private entity‘s lawmaking competency more resemble those 
of public institutions. In such a case, private Constitutional Law will be 
ill-suited to prevent unacceptably bad decisions. This is because private 
Constitutional Law has been tuned to respond to the typical failings of 
private entities, not those of public entities more similar to the actor 
with respect to the decision at issue. 
To put it differently, the legal constraints on contracting parties are 
tuned to the problems private lawmakers typically encounter. Some acts 
of private lawmaking are, however, far more like public lawmaking, for 
which there are different types of constraints addressed to the 
stereotypical problems that attend making laws that bind non-
consenting others. Private actors engaged in the equivalent of public 
legislation therefore present a state action problem, meaning that they 
are poorly governed by the usual private secondary rules. 
But finding a state action problem is only the first step in applying a 
sensible state action doctrine. The existence of such a problem does not 
imply that the only solution is to empower a judge to impose public 
Constitutional Law on the private actor. Rather, state action problems 
create tension in a legal system that may be resolved in a number of 
ways. Federal or state legal systems, by legislation or common law, can 
supply appropriate governance of categories of state action problems by 
means other than formal application of their public constitutional rules. 
For example, the rules passed by homeowner associations, despite their 
private source, are routinely put to a higher, more public-like standard 
of review than are ordinary contractual provisions. Such review, as will 
be discussed further, is a solution to a clear state action problem, but 
one that does not rely on wholesale classification of the association as a 
public lawmaker.  
It is only when (1) the mismatch between the governing private 
metalaw and private lawmaker is severe and (2) the political (and other) 
branches within the legal system have failed to supply a solution and 
are peculiarly disabled from doing so that courts, as a last resort, 
consider declaring that the private actor is in fact a ―state actor.‖ The 
state action doctrine as we know it is, therefore, a body of law intended 
5
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to solve a coupled institutional problem. First, is the lawmaking at issue, 
though formally private, so unlike stereotypical private conduct or 
lawmaking that the institutional controls of ordinary, private 
Constitutional Law are a bad fit? Second, is there a reason for courts to 
attempt to solve this problem themselves by imposing public, rather 
than private, Constitutional Law?
9
 
This two-dimensional understanding of the state action doctrine 
solves the doctrinal puzzle. It tells us, for example, why race is such a 
salient factor in state action cases—why the result in Shelley is 
principled and not just the exercise of judicial power to achieve a 
political objective. It also tells us why Shelley would and should come 
out differently were other constitutional values than racial equality at 
stake. It does so by analyzing institutional competence, rather than 
substance. Perhaps counterintuitively, institutional analysis better 
focuses legal debate on the heart of the normative disagreements that 
make these cases intuitively difficult: the line between the individual 
and the collective and the power to decide where to draw the line. 
In Part I of this Article, I briefly describe the state action doctrine 
and its difficulties. To explain the institutional approach, I then review 
the public–private theory of legal systems and define, within that 
theory, the two-step state action inquiry. In Part III, I contrast this 
structural theory of state action with more traditional theories and study 
their varying applications to some canonical state action cases.  
* * * 
The public–private distinction defines the underlying structure of 
legal systems. Properly understood and focused, it defines our legal 
bedrock, giving shape to legal systems while remaining mostly unseen, 
buried under an apparently disordered surface. The state action doctrine 
represents the ragged, rocky outcroppings of this bedrock. State action 
cases are difficult to classify, unrecognizable, and hard to square with 
other doctrine. They are the puzzling cases that challenge the most basic 
principles of lawmaking and adjudication—principles that normally lie 
safely under the surface, intuited but rarely analyzed, in most of our 
legal landscape. If we want to understand these hidden principles better, 
                                                                                                                     
 9. This is a more general theory of state action than most. All legal systems encounter 
state action problems, as they all must grapple with categorizing lawmaking institutions to be 
governed by public or private metalaw. The first step of the theory I advance here, the 
identification of state action problems, does not depend on the legal system‘s having institutions 
that are like legislatures or courts. Only the theory‘s second step is specially adapted to our own 
structure, depending as it does on a legal system‘s welfare-orientation and division of power 
between institutions that resemble courts and legislatures in the relevant respects. 
6
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then we should, like geologists, train our attention on the outcroppings 
that seem to defy all the normal rules. 
I.  EXISTING DOCTRINE AND APPROACHES 
The state action doctrine deals with a group of cases that seem to 
contradict ordinary judicial experience. A court will have before it a 
private actor, but there exists some reason to think our Constitution 
ought to apply to this actor as it does against public actors. Perhaps he 
has suppressed speech or discriminated in a manner that is not forbidden 
by statutes or other laws targeted at private individuals. Nonetheless, 
and for reasons we will endeavor to understand, an unusual argument 
seems plausible, an argument normally foreign to litigation among 
private parties: that the written Constitution provides a reason to forbid 
the private conduct at issue. The doctrinal problem has been to construct 
rules and standards to guide the decision whether it does. 
The Supreme Court long has labored to construct such a framework. 
The catholic nature of its efforts was illustrated in Brentwood Academy 
v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n.10 There, the Court 
described the state action doctrine as a search for a ―close nexus 
between the State and the challenged action.‖11 Stressing that the 
doctrine contains no clear necessary or sufficient conditions, the Court 
summarized various factors that have at times been found controlling.
12
 
It is important first of all to distinguish among the cases that fall 
under the state action rubric. Only some of these raise the 
Categorization Problem with which this Article is concerned. For 
example, the Court has stated in several cases that the key to finding 
state action lies in determining ―when it can be said that the State is 
responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.‖13 
This test, though conceptually appealing, speaks only to cases in which 
the problem is with governmental conduct, perhaps because of its 
contribution to invidious private conduct. Unless stripped of meaning, it 
does nothing to explain a finding of state action in the cases that 
concern us here—cases like Shelley, Marsh, or Terry v. Adams,14 in 
                                                                                                                     
 10. 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
 11. Id. at 295–96 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 12. Id. These factors include State participation through: (1) its ―coercive power,‖ (2) the 
provision of overt or covert ―significant encouragement,‖ (3) involvement as a ―joint‖ actor, 
(4) control of the private actor as an agency, (5) delegation of a public function, or 
(6) ―entwine[ment]‖ with the private actor, either through its policies or through ―management 
or control.‖ Id. at 296. 
 13. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). 
 14. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 475–77 (1953) (holding that the election process 
of the private Jaybird Party violated the Fifteenth Amendment, even though the process was not 
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which the state‘s participation was confined to upholding private 
agreements or rules and, in doing so, omitting more stringent 
regulations. If judicial enforcement of a private agreement is enough to 
say that the court—and by extension, the state—is ―responsible‖ for the 
specific conduct, then there is no serious limitation to what may 
constitute state action. Every private agreement a court attempted to 
enforce would be reviewed for its constitutionality. 
But ―responsibility‖ as a criterion for state action is problematic even 
if it could be given a reasonably certain meaning that draws a far more 
modest line. After all, if the problem in a case is the State‘s 
responsibility, rather than the public-like character of the private actor, 
it would seem more logical to target the State itself—to seek an end to 
the State’s conduct that is, in fact, ―responsible for the specific conduct 
of which the plaintiff complains.‖ And yet, the remedy for the State‘s 
responsibility is typically in the form of a judgment against the private 
defendant, not the State. Why is this? 
Progress in this area depends at the outset on understanding that not 
all state action cases are the same. There is a class of cases involving 
actual conduct by government agents to aid a private party, resulting in 
injuries to plaintiffs that would surely be unconstitutional if caused by 
the government agents directly. Public agents are surely regulated 
according to public Constitutional Law, and I would treat the claims of 
plaintiffs in such cases as complaints directed at stopping the 
government's own conduct.  
For example, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
15
 the 
constitutional claim should have been against the government for its 
own hosting of a racially discriminatory tenant when it had the power 
not to do so. Under the theory I will develop here, the tenant would not 
be susceptible to constitutional regulation directly, as the case does not 
involve a state action problem.
16
 But that does not mean that the 
                                                                                                                     
regulated by the State); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19–21 (1948) (holding that state courts‘ 
enforcement of racist restrictive covenants constituted state action for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504–09 (1946) (holding that a state 
trespassing statute preventing distribution of religious materials on a town‘s sidewalk was 
unconstitutional, even though the sidewalk was part of a privately-owned company town). 
 15. 365 U.S. 715, 716–17 (1961) (finding unconstitutional state action where a private 
tenant of a state agency operated a cafe in the agency‘s public parking garage in a facially 
racially discriminatory manner). 
 16. There is, I admit, some uncertainty here. But whether or not the much more difficult 
claim can be made that the Court should treat the private actor as a public actor on account of 
the state action doctrine, the point here is that there is an entirely separate claim that the 
governmental parking authority itself acted unconstitutionally in continuing to lease out public 
space that was subject to racially discriminatory operations. Mixing the question of 
unconstitutional governmental conduct with the separate question of the public character of the 
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Constitution has nothing to say about the dispute in that case. The 
problem in Burton was with formal government support of 
discrimination, not with a private actor that is so coercive, powerful, or 
otherwise public-like that constitutional regulation of it, directly, is 
appropriate.
17
 
I classify cases involving perhaps ordinary private actors whose 
conduct is questioned because of actual governmental support or control 
as ―find the state‖ cases.18 I do not venture here to improve the analysis 
of these cases, cases I believe should turn on the constitutional propriety 
of whatever it is that the government is doing in support. The question 
is not so much one of whether the private party is a state actor, although 
government control could lead a court to find that a putatively private 
party is a state agent for constitutional purposes. Rather, the question is 
whether those actions that are concededly those of the state are 
unconstitutional. Let us for now, though, leave such cases behind.
19
 
While they involve their own difficult problems of line drawing, 
agency, and competing conceptions of governmental duties, they do not 
raise the more fundamental issue of assessing the appropriate role and 
character of the public–private distinction in classifying actors, as the 
most difficult state action cases do. 
This Article is concerned with state action cases in which the 
complaint is only with the private party‘s own conduct, as to which 
there is some reason to think public Constitutional Law is the 
appropriate governing regime. And the question I ask is what reason 
that should be. The Court‘s doctrine has been promiscuous in 
                                                                                                                     
actor leads to confusion. 
 17. Which of these adjectives matter, and why, is the topic of the next Part. 
 18. When teaching state action to students, I have sometimes referred to the theory behind 
these ―find the state‖ cases using the regrettably and increasingly outmoded term ―Scooby Doo 
theory.‖ Under such a theory, a court will endeavor to pull back the mask of the private actor 
and reveal the face of the State; the private actor then declaring that he or she would have gotten 
away with it but for the pesky plaintiffs. 
 19. I include in this category cases such as Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger, 513 
U.S. 374 (1995), San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 
(1987), and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). In each of these, the gravamen of the 
state action litigation theory was the nature of the government‘s involvement. See Lebron, 513 
U.S. at 398–400 (finding Amtrak, as a government-created and -controlled corporation, to be a 
state actor); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 543–47 (finding that the U.S. Olympic 
Committee is a private actor despite receipt of government favors); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 
839–43 (finding a private school to be a private actor despite receipt of public funds). As I have 
stated, it would be better to view these cases as raising questions about the constitutionality of 
the government’s aid of private organizations that carry out what would be unconstitutional 
activities if the government did them directly. That is a different question than whether the 
private actor is so specially situated, again in ways we will seek to uncover, that constitutional 
regulation as if the private actor were a governmental entity is appropriate. 
9
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entertaining a number of intuitive stances, for it is difficult to call them 
theories, to reach results in difficult cases.
20
 
The cases leading up to Justice Souter‘s summary in Brentwood 
further illustrate that there is no set of circumstances, much less a 
principle establishing such a set, that is necessary or sufficient to find 
state action. The Court found state action when state courts enforced 
racially discriminatory private covenants,
21
 when a company town 
ejected a religious speaker,
22
 and when a private group held a statewide 
primary that had no formal binding effect but was used to select 
political candidates.
23
 It has refused to find state action when a 
monopoly provider of electrical power cut service without what the 
plaintiff claimed was the process due,
24
 when a private club used 
racially discriminatory membership policies,
25
 and when a private 
warehouse sold an evicted apartment dweller‘s belongings without her 
consent.
26
 And it has reversed itself on whether shopping malls that are 
open to the public but discriminate among speakers have engaged in 
state action.
27
 
In reaching these decisions, the Court has adverted to the potential 
salience of a private actor‘s monopoly power,28 the enforcement by 
public courts as a kind of public ratification,
29
 the public nature of the 
private actor,
30
 the relative weights of the rights on either side,
31
 a more 
generalized ―nexus‖ of some sort between the actor and the State,32 and 
a number of other arguments. Sometimes these kinds of facts have been 
found decisive, sometimes unavailing. But it is unclear which facts truly 
matter, how much they matter, or why they matter. The problem is not 
only that the set of salient facts is not defined. It is that there is no 
                                                                                                                     
 20. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor 
of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 303–04 
(1995) (explaining that the Supreme Court has developed three state action tests, each difficult 
to apply and of little help in solving the inconsistency of the state action doctrine). 
 21. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). 
 22. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). 
 23. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 477 (1953). 
 24. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974). 
 25. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972). 
 26. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978). 
 27. Hudgens v. Nat‘l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976) (announcing that 
―the rationale of [Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 
391 U.S. 308 (1968)],‖ in which the Court found that a shopping mall engaged in state action, 
―did not survive . . . [Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)]‖). 
 28. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 159–60; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350–51. 
 29. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19–23 (1948). 
 30. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1946). 
 31. Id. at 505–09. 
 32. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).  
10
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doctrinal statement or even a loose theory concerning how these facts 
should be evaluated and weighed against one another. 
In Marsh v. Alabama, the company-town case, the Court declared 
that ―[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for 
use by the public in general, the more do his rights become 
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who 
use it.‖33 This has surely been a justification for antidiscrimination 
statutes applicable to places of public accommodation,
34
 but as a 
statement concerning the application of public Constitutional Law it is 
woefully incomplete. No court has found that a business is a state actor 
bound to respect ―constitutional rights‖ merely because it has opened 
itself to the public in general.
35
 This factor alone cannot explain, if it 
can be explained, how it could be thought that Marsh is correct but that 
its reasoning should not extend to other businesses.
36
 
An extensive record of scholarship exists on this sort of state action 
question. While each theoretical approach uncovers important truths, 
each is found wanting by proving too much, standing for too little, 
appearing to state a test but ultimately passing the untransformed 
question to courts, or otherwise failing to grapple with what is actually 
difficult in these cases. Our intuition is onto something, but the theories 
do not fully follow it. 
In broad, taxonomic outline, they concern ad hoc factors, a balance 
of the competing rights of the plaintiff and defendant, the degree of an 
actor‘s power in the market, or the actor‘s formal public or private 
status. Part III will explore these in more detail and contrast their 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506.  
 34. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 
854–55 (2001) (arguing that when an accommodation is open to the public, a desire to 
discriminate is economically irrational and can only be motivated by ―illegitimate‖ private 
desires the state should ―destroy‖). 
 35. See, e.g., Brooks v. Chicago Downs Ass‘n, 791 F.2d 512, 515–19 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(approving private exclusion for any reasons other than those prohibited by statute). 
 36. The Court‘s further observation that ―[w]hether a corporation or a municipality owns 
or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the 
community in such manner that the channels of communication remain free‖ is on its face 
unhelpful. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507. Read too coarsely, it suggests a sort of durability of 
individual, constitutional rights and the need to protect them regardless of whether the threat is 
governmental or private. Rights are rights, and contra Hohfeld, they are inherent rather than 
relational. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30–32 (1913) (arguing that a ―right‖ necessarily refers to a 
correlative ―duty‖). But there is more than a hint of a far better and more interesting idea here. 
The problem the Court identifies is not the mere blocking of an individual‘s speech by a private 
entity, but the blocking of whole ―channels,‖ disrupting the ―functioning of the community.‖ 
Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507. This approach, as will be shown, is consistent with the doctrinal test 
derived from the institutional theory I develop in this Article. 
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application with that of the institutional theory I develop next. But a 
brief description of these approaches will help to show why the move to 
institutional analysis is promising. 
Ad hoc tests based on arrays of factors suffer from the familiar 
problems of multifactor balancing tests. Such tests may provide some 
degree of guidance by at least excluding some issues from 
consideration, but, ultimately, they delegate to courts the relatively 
unmodified question of whether an actor is ―state-like‖ or sufficiently 
connected to the state. 
Subtly different from the ad hoc approach are those theories that 
advocate junking or substantially limiting the state action doctrine and 
instead balancing the constitutionally relevant interests of each side of 
the dispute, with perhaps ancillary reliance on other policies.
37
 The 
trouble with this approach, aside from the extent of regulatory authority 
it delegates to courts, is that it assumes that constitutional regulation 
would be better but for the abrogation of individual, constitutional rights 
it necessarily entails. As I will argue, this approach takes inadequate 
account of the fact that Constitutional Law is tailored to the institutions 
it governs.
38
 A private actor may be poorly governed by constitutional 
rules, not only because such rules would abrogate the actor‘s own 
constitutional rights, but also because private actors are not the types of 
entities constitutional rules are designed to govern.  
An actor‘s power in the market provides a seemingly better 
justification for finding state action.
39
 Under this kind of approach, state 
                                                                                                                     
 37. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (1985) 
(arguing that the state action doctrine should be eliminated and replaced by a balancing test in 
which courts would weigh the right infringed against the justification for the infringing activity); 
Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 481 
(1962) (arguing for state action when the state could have proscribed the private denial of 
constitutional rights if so finding is not outweighed by the actor‘s liberty and property rights); 
William W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 53 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961) (arguing 
for examining the effects on the interests and on local authority of the parties of federal 
intervention); see also Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional 
Limits on Private Power, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 372 (1993) (setting forth a three-question 
state action inquiry, centering on whether the private rights violation has similar effects as state 
denial would and, if so, whether the justifications for upholding private denial are substantially 
weightier than those for upholding state denial would be). 
 38. See infra Subsection III.A.3. 
 39. See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—
Protection of Personal Rights From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 
(1952) (examining the theory that large corporations, because they are creatures of the state and 
exert great economic control over the citizenry, should be subject to constitutional restraints); 
Jesse H. Choper, Commentary, Thoughts on State Action: The ―Government Function‖ and 
―Power Theory‖ Approaches, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 757 (1979) (endorsing a finding of state 
action when private parties exercise governmental power); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Changing 
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action exists if a private actor wields substantial market power, perhaps 
literally monopolistic. But what kind of power matters, and why? Why 
should relative wealth trigger regulation by constitutional regulations 
meant to govern the state? To the extent that market power is a proxy 
for finding coercive capacity, the theory looks in the right place. As I 
will argue, however, power alone is a descriptively and normatively 
inadequate basis for finding state action.
40
 It is manifestly not the case 
that powerful private actors are considered state actors under the 
Supreme Court‘s doctrine. More critically, I will argue that looking only 
to private power fails to grapple with both the suitability of public 
Constitutional Law as a means of regulation, and the capacity of courts 
to apply it or its principles wisely in such cases. 
The formal-identification approach urges that the state action label 
be reserved for formal, government officials.
41
 There is an important 
intuition in this very rule-like approach, which suggests the 
inappropriateness of the application of the rules of government to 
private parties and which is perhaps also skeptical of courts‘ abilities to 
apply such rules to private parties. It would not, however, be able to 
sustain the results in a number of existing cases, including Shelley. 
Which of these approaches should be used? What really matters? Is 
it the importance of the individual rights, the power of the private actor, 
or the individual rights of the private actor or his or her opponents? Is it 
a balance of all of these? Or is it only the actor‘s formal status, the 
actor‘s resemblance to a recognizable form of state agency, or the 
resemblance of the actor‘s particular conduct to typical governmental 
conduct? The cases do not tell us. The theorists disagree, and there does 
not seem to be a good way to evaluate the competing arguments. 
As I will explain, the root of the problem is that the Court and most 
scholars have shoehorned what should be a two-step inquiry about the 
nature of institutions (namely, the private actor and the Court itself) into 
a single, purportedly substantive inquiry into the ―nexus‖ between the 
private actor and the state, even for state action cases that are not ―find 
the state‖ cases.42 It doesn't work. To see why, and to focus the doctrine 
                                                                                                                     
Concepts of Equality: From Equality Before the Law to the Welfare State, 1979 WASH U. L. Q. 
741, 744 (1979) (arguing for state action, inter alia, where a private exercise of power is 
literally monopolistic, like government action). 
 40. See infra notes 115–20 and accompanying text. 
 41. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, 
and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 333–34 (1993) 
(arguing for limiting the doctrine to sanctioned acts of government officials). 
 42. See Dilan A. Esper, Note, Some Thoughts on the Puzzle of State Action, 68 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 663, 682–87 (1995) (describing the nexus ―theory‖ of state action). 
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on the right questions, we must first understand the public–private 
institutional structure that all legal systems share. 
II.  THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF STATE ACTION: AN ALTERNATIVE 
APPROACH 
Beneath a jumbled surface teeming with doctrines, principles, rules, 
and exceptions, legal systems are built on a bedrock of simple 
distinctions between what is public and what is private. Basic to 
collective governance are decisions concerning what institutions should 
exercise what kinds of legal authority. And the primary choice of 
institution is that between a public actor on the one hand and a private 
actor on the other.
43
 
This underlying public–private structure of legal systems is usually 
not apparent in practice. The focus in most legal disputes is on subject-
specific doctrine, but this specificity is often illusory. What looks like a 
doctrine peculiar to an area of contract law, for example, can instead be 
understood as the consequence of applying a much more general 
principle to that area‘s particular institutional context. While there is 
much to be gained from understanding these trans-substantive 
principles, legal disputes are almost always resolved without 
acknowledging them directly. 
The state action cases lie in that area of our law where the public–
private distinction—and thus an inevitable grappling with basic 
principles—comes to the surface. These cases are outcroppings of law‘s 
public–private bedrock, exposing the normally hidden complexity of the 
boundaries. By studying them, we learn more about law‘s underlying 
structure. And more importantly, by understanding the bedrock, we can 
finally make sense of these seemingly mysterious outcroppings. 
In this Part, I will begin by describing law‘s public–private structure 
and explaining how public and private lawmaking each are governed by 
specially tuned bodies of Constitutional Law intended to solve the 
predictable institutional problems of these very different lawmakers. 
Then, I will turn to an institutional theory of state action in legal 
systems. A firm understanding of the public–private structure will 
render obvious the two-part inquiry at the heart of our own state action 
doctrine: identification of state action problems followed by an analysis 
of the need for and ability of courts to solve them. 
A.  The Bedrock 
Legal systems are structured at their basic level by divisions of 
authority between public and private decision makers. It is intuitive, 
                                                                                                                     
 43. See generally Turner, supra note 7. 
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after all, that among any collective‘s initial and most important projects 
is to define those things it will do collectively and those it will leave to 
its individual members.
44
 With respect to its legal system, the rules 
under which the collective will use its coercive power can be 
collectively (publicly) or individually (privately) made. Putative 
violations can be publicly or privately prosecuted. This basic division of 
authority defines our most fundamental legal categories.
45
 Privately 
made and privately prosecuted law, I call Contract Law. Publicly made 
and privately prosecuted law, I call Tort Law. Publicly made and 
publicly prosecuted law, I call Criminal Law. And, privately made and 
publicly prosecuted law, I call Parens Patriae. These categories are 
summarized in the following chart: 
 
 
Privately 
Created 
Publicly 
Created 
Privately 
Prosecuted 
Contract Law Tort Law 
Publicly 
Prosecuted 
Parens Patriae Criminal Law 
 
The power of this taxonomy of legal systems arises from its 
characterization of substantive law in terms of institutional control. The 
public and the private are the highest-level institutions within any 
collective. Each will invariably contain numerous subdivisions 
(legislatures and courts, for example, on the public side, corporations 
and families, for example, on the private side), but these subinstitutions 
inherit many features of, and legal rules applicable to, the parent 
institutional category. By creating a substantive map of legal systems in 
terms of institutional control over basic decisions, we can 
(1) understand apparently substantive problems in institutional terms 
and (2) translate problems and results from one substantive area of law 
to another by noting and adjusting for the different institutional 
environments. 
But how do we decide who makes and prosecutes which kinds of 
law and under what constraints? That is, how do we populate the 
taxonomy‘s boxes? Legal systems have ―metalaw‖ to answer these 
questions about their laws. I call the metalaw governing the making of 
law ―Constitutional Law‖ and the metalaw governing the prosecution of 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Id. at 1009 & n.15. 
 45. Id. at 1010–13. 
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law violations ―Procedure.‖46 Thus, the basic public–private structure of 
legal systems is summarized in this chart. 
 
 
Constitutional Law 
Privately 
Created 
Publicly 
Created 
Procedure 
Privately 
Prosecuted 
Contract Law Tort Law 
Publicly 
Prosecuted 
Parens Patriae Criminal Law 
 
Legal systems therefore possess a body of private Constitutional 
Law and a body of public Constitutional Law. Their differences reflect 
the institutional contrasts between the lawmakers in each category. 
What is usually called ―contract law‖ (including the rules of offer and 
acceptance and other criteria for contract validity, the rules governing 
contract interpretation and construction, and the rules concerning the 
making and enforcement of contracts) is, in fact, the ―Constitutional 
Law of Contracts.‖ Contract law itself is the body of substantive law 
specified by the many individual terms arising out of the universe of 
privately created contracts. 
While all Constitutional Law, public and private, concerns the rules 
for selecting lawmakers, determining the scope of their powers, and the 
measurement of enactments for compliance with various policies—
structure and rights in the usual parlance—these rules are quite different 
in Contract than in Tort and Criminal Law. The taxonomy helps us to 
appreciate that these rules differ precisely because they apply in 
different institutional contexts. Because private and public lawmakers 
have different stereotypical strengths and weaknesses, the metalaw 
governing their lawmaking decisions will differ in response to these 
characteristics. 
So, for example, Contract‘s lawmakers are determined by a few rules 
(for example, age and other capacity rules) but primarily by standards 
meant to establish the consent of the parties who would be bound.
47
 If a 
proposed law has the consent of all the parties who might be obligated 
under it, then that law is, as an ex ante matter, appropriately enacted by 
the consenting parties. That is, we vest private parties with lawmaking 
power over laws that will bind only them. 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Id. at 1013. 
 47. Id. at 1035–38; see also, e.g., Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal 
Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1403 (2009) (―In contract theory, 
consent is indispensable . . . .‖). 
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Contrast this with publicly made laws, where lawmakers are chosen 
by rule-like procedures, normally by popular voting or appointment by 
other public officials, and given the authority to make laws of certain 
types regardless of the consent of the individuals who will be bound as a 
result.
48
 Public lawmakers are empowered to make laws that will bind 
others. Because of this, the rules for public lawmaker selection and 
legislative scope are tuned to control the deficiencies private individuals 
might normally have when making laws that will apply to others. 
Even if private and public lawmakers are vested with authority, their 
output might prove contrary to the public good. While they appeared 
appropriately positioned to make law as an ex ante matter, reading the 
law ex post it may become clear that the institution failed to perform as 
designed. Contracts, though apparently voluntary, may be 
unconscionable or contrary to public policy.
49
 Public laws, though 
validly enacted, may violate important rights (which I will, for 
convenience, refer to under the umbrella term ―due process‖).50  
Constitutional Law meant to detect these sorts of problems with 
legislative output is of a different type than that which governs 
lawmaker selection ex ante. I have identified two abstract, 
institutionally grounded principles from which these two branches of 
Constitutional Law can be derived.
51
 
I have labeled the ―first principle,‖ or ex ante principle, the 
imperative that decision makers be selected and empowered in a way 
that is likely to render them institutionally competent. This means that 
they are likely to act consistently with an attempt at some optimization 
of a social welfare function.
52
 Deconstructing an arbitrary function into 
the capacities needed appropriately to perform it, I have identified five 
discrete, core competencies: private calculation, public calculation, 
aggregation, distribution, and resource.
53
 These five points of 
institutional comparison give us a somewhat crude but at least analytical 
method of evaluation, an institutional calculus. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Turner, supra note 7, at 1038–42. 
 49. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2011) (―If the court as a matter of law finds the contract 
or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may 
refuse to enforce the contract . . . .‖); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981) 
(explaining when a contract is void as contrary to public policy).  
 50. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936) (noting that due process 
protects ―principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental‖ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 51. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1033–34. 
 52. I do not assume any particular function. 
 53. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1018–20. 
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  Private calculation competency reflects the ability of an 
institution to estimate the preferences of others with respect 
to the decision at hand. An individual is often, but not always, 
the best calculator of his own preferences and therefore 
usually has a private calculation advantage over others with 
respect to decisions that affect only him.
54
  
  Public calculation competency refers to the ability to assess 
that portion, if any, of the collective good not reflected in 
individual preferences.
55
 If such public preferences exist, 
private institutions are often, but not always, relatively less 
competent to assess them than appropriately constituted 
public entities.  
  Aggregation competency is the ability of a decision-making 
entity to combine these preference inputs, weighing and 
ordering them according to the collective will.
56
  
  A particular kind of aggregation competency is the ability to 
weigh the preferences of another as heavily as one‘s own. I 
call this capacity to decide unselfishly distributive 
competency.
57
  
  And finally, resource competency is the possession of the 
means actually to effect a decision.
58
 
 
Any two institutions, and in particular a public and a private entity, 
can be compared by their relative advantages in these core 
competencies. My first principle demands that lawmakers be selected 
and empowered in such a way that the resulting lawmaking body will 
possess all of these competencies.
59
 This institutionally posed principle 
yields substantive legal rules when reduced to application in a specific 
institutional context.  
The first principle applied to private lawmaking leads to a rule that a 
contract must have the consent of all those who would be bound by its 
terms. Private individuals are stereotypically well-positioned to take 
account of their own preferences.
60
 While they are sometimes able to 
calculate the preferences of other individuals, it would be problematic to 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Id. at 1019. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1020. 
 59. Id. at 1034–42. 
 60. See, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 77 (1921) (―Every 
person is the final and absolute judge of his own welfare and interests.‖); Turner, supra note 7, 
at 1019.  
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permit an individual to make law for another outside of narrow 
circumstances.
61
 This may be due in part to a misapprehension of the 
other‘s preferences, but it is certainly the case that individuals almost 
always weigh their own preferences more heavily than those of others. 
The tendency toward distributive disadvantage is so severe in individual 
private lawmakers that societies generally bar them from making laws 
that bind non-consenting others.
62
 
Private groups of individuals, however, can solve this problem 
through agreement. By manifesting agreement to be bound, a private 
group can signal that it is, collectively, distributively competent and 
well-calculating.
63
 If the group believes it will be better off with a law 
applicable only to itself, many societies will enforce the law, believing 
that individuals know themselves best and that society is better off when 
its members are better off. As an ex ante matter, before the content of its 
law is examined, a consenting group of lawmakers proposing to bind 
only itself has all the core competencies and satisfies the first 
principle.
64
  
Contrast this with public lawmaking bodies, those invested with the 
necessary but hazardous responsibility of making law that will bind 
others involuntarily. These bodies must be chosen in a way that 
maximizes their potential to take account of others‘ preferences (private 
calculation competency) and, most critically, minimizes the risk that 
lawmaking authority will be used for private gain or for the enrichment 
of some groups at the expense of others contrary to the collective will 
(distributive and aggregative competency). Selection mechanisms, 
which often seem to be rule-like and formal, and lawmaking procedures 
are tuned to ensuring good agency.
65
 Private contracting groups, by 
contrast, are not bound by rules that condition their authority on being 
good agents of non-members, because they, unlike public lawmaking 
bodies, are rarely empowered to make laws binding non-members. 
                                                                                                                     
 61. Such circumstances include the parent–child relationship and guardianships. See, e.g., 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (―It is cardinal with us that the custody, care 
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include 
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.‖); W.J. Dunn, Annotation, 
Mental Condition Which Will Justify the Appointment of Guardian, Committee, or Conservator 
of the Estate for an Incompetent or Spendthrift, 9 A.L.R.3D 774, § 2[a] (1961) (―[I]t now seems 
to be well settled that the courts may appoint a guardian, conservator, or committee to manage 
the property or estate of another, without a finding that the ward is generally or totally insane.‖). 
 62. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1022–23. 
 63. Id. at 1022. 
 64. Id. at 1035–36. 
 65. See id. at 1039–40 (citing and discussing Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of 
Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (2004)). 
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The ―second principle,‖ or ex post principle, examines decision-
making output for manifest institutional failure.
66
 Such failures occur 
when a lawmaking body, despite compliance with the first principle, 
nonetheless generates a law demonstrating that it lacks the core 
competencies. Even though the first principle may have been satisfied, a 
law‘s content can reveal, ex post, a lawmaker‘s core incompetence. In 
the private context, unconscionability is, at bottom, a doctrine derived 
from the second principle. It is an inquiry into whether an apparently 
voluntary—and thus first-principle compliant—agreement is so unfair 
that it manifests substantial private-calculation failure (ignorance) or 
distributive failure (coercion).
67
 Both are ways that, ex post, a private 
law‘s output can negate the ex ante presumption that apparent consent 
reflects actual voluntarism.  
Further, a private law that is otherwise voluntary but is contrary to 
public policy is one that manifests a failure of public calculation or 
aggregation advantage.
68
 In our legal culture, voluntary assent to a 
private law that will bind only the contracting parties is usually assumed 
to be in the public interest.
69
 If those affected believe they will be better 
off with the law and if no other entities are affected, then we presume 
the enactment contributes to the public good. On rare occasions, 
however, this is not the case. Examining the contract, the output of the 
private lawmaking process, it may become apparent that the parties 
lacked public calculation or aggregation advantage; even though they 
were unselfish among themselves and fully took into account their 
compound welfare, they failed egregiously to measure the impact on 
total social welfare in the same way the public would.
70
 Their decision 
                                                                                                                     
 66. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1042–45.  
 67. See, e.g., Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 410 (1889) (describing an 
unconscionable contract as one ―no man in his senses, not under delusion, would make‖); 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(―Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice 
on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable 
to the other party.‖). 
 68. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1035 n.70.. 
 69. See, e.g., K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 702 (1939) 
(reviewing O. PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND 
CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)) (―Our courts are loath indeed to throw out a contract clause under 
the plain justification that it is contrary to public policy . . . .‖).  
 70. See, e.g., United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988) (―[A] parent‘s 
contract allowing a third person to burn, assault or torture his child is void.‖); Dwyer v. Jung, 
336 A.2d 498, 501 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), aff’d per curiam, 348 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1975) (invalidating a restrictive covenant between lawyers because it harmed the 
public‘s ―unlimited choice of counsel‖); McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 486 P.2d 1093, 
1097 (Wash. 1971) (invalidating an exculpatory clause in a landlord–tenant contract, ―the 
generalized use of which may have an impact upon thousands of potential tenants‖). 
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in such a situation, therefore, does not match the reason they are, 
institutionally, given lawmaking power in the first place, because they 
have not enhanced overall social welfare through private empowerment. 
In the public lawmaking context, the various due process rights serve 
the ex post examination function that unconscionability and public 
policy limits provide in private contracting.
71
 Assuring voluntarism of 
all those affected is no longer the institutional strategy. Unlike private 
contracting parties, public lawmakers are agents. The first principle 
yields specific constitutional efforts to secure good lawmaking agents, 
including rules concerning representative selection schemes and public 
visibility intended to promote accountability, but these are no 
guarantee.
72
 Like any agents, public lawmakers may miscalculate the 
principal‘s wants or even substitute their own wants for the principal‘s. 
For this reason, public Constitutional Law is concerned with 
encouraging good agency, choosing and structuring agents in such a 
way that they are more likely to take proper account of individual 
welfare and to act unselfishly and policing lawmaking output for 
manifest institutional failure. For example, a public law that pursued 
private redistributive efforts, in contravention of the public good, would 
run afoul of the second principle.
73
  
Because public Constitutional Law polices agent behavior rather 
than consent, it often authorizes more searching review of lawmaking 
output under the second principle than private Constitutional Law does. 
While it is possible that apparent consent in Contract Law hides 
coercion, there is probably a far greater danger that public lawmaking 
agents may abuse their status to pursue nonpublic ends. And while it is 
possible that contracting parties, even those creating obligations only 
among themselves, may try to enact laws that conflict with public 
norms or have adverse social effects beyond the parties, there is, here 
too, a far greater danger that public laws binding broad swaths of 
society will be inimical to social values. Our own law reflects these 
concerns, subjecting publicly made law to more numerous and 
comprehensive prohibitions and to greater judicial scrutiny than 
privately made law. In what follows, we will explore just how much 
more control courts have over the substance of public laws.  
This difference in treatment under the second principle means that 
much turns on the characterization of law as publicly or privately made. 
                                                                                                                     
 71. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1043–45. 
 72. Id.; see also Vermeule, supra note 65, at 381–82. 
 73. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1039; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (―There may be private transfers in which the risk of 
undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable 
or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause.‖). 
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I call this sort of problem, where the metalegal treatment of an 
institution‘s output depends on the characterization of an institution, a 
Categorization Problem. Such a problem, as noted above, lies at the root 
of our difficulty with the state action doctrine. So let us turn now to the 
Categorization Problem arising from the distinction with which the 
doctrine grapples—that between public and private lawmaking.  
B.  The Outcropping 
The public–private structure of legal systems suggests that the 
private creation and private enforcement of law will be regulated 
differently, owing to the private character of the lawmakers and 
prosecutor, than will be the public creation and public enforcement of 
law. The public and private are fundamentally different institutional 
types, prone to different kinds of deviations from the public interest, and 
thus their decisions are subjected to different forms of scrutiny. But how 
do we tell in a given case whether the decision-making entity is public 
or private? 
In most legal systems, the question whether an act of lawmaking was 
public or private is almost always resolved without any conscious effort. 
Nearly all lawmaking is, under the system‘s rules, clearly public or 
clearly private. This is not to say that there is uniform agreement, as a 
theoretical matter, to the public or private nature of the dispute in total. 
Rather, by this I mean that there is usually no argument made 
concerning the appropriate body of Constitutional Law that should 
apply: All parties agree to apply either public or private Constitutional 
Law without even thinking to disagree. The bedrock, shaped by a set of 
public–private distinctions, is stable and essentially forgotten despite the 
fact that so much turns on it.
74
 
When the bedrock outcrops, however, revealing that the public or 
private nature of the lawmaker presents an unresolved Categorization 
Problem, a great deal of theoretical confusion ensues. In the United 
States, we do little more than muddle through such situations, and the 
resulting cases are criticized as unprincipled and chaotic. These cases, 
nonetheless, have established a state action doctrine that is mostly on 
                                                                                                                     
 74. To be sure, one could design a legal system in which this stability and invisibility are 
absent. Suppose that acts of public lawmaking were identified not by detailed rules identifying 
public agents but by a standard that measured the ―public impact‖ of an otherwise private act, 
together with various other criteria. If met, the act would be privileged as law binding on those 
having nothing to do with the act. It is not difficult to anticipate contests over the application of 
this judicially-managed standard in nearly every case of private lawmaking. There are reasons 
based in the first principle to think that legal systems are unlikely to depart much from clear 
rules to identify public lawmaking agents. But I do not claim that the public–private distinction 
is necessarily a hidden fault line in all legal systems. 
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sound theoretical footing. The public–private structure theory, casting 
state action cases as problems of selecting between public and private 
Constitutional Law, allows us to see why this is so. 
I begin this section by demonstrating how the public–private 
structure theory focuses the state action analysis on the right problem, 
that of the selection of secondary rules. I then develop a two-part, 
institutional test that judges should use to decide whether there is state 
action justifying application of public constitutional principles to private 
activity. In the first part of the test, we ask whether there is a state action 
problem, meaning a mismatch between the private lawmaking at issue 
and the private Constitutional Law meant to govern it. In the second, we 
ask whether courts are the appropriate body to supply a solution to the 
mismatch. 
1.  The Nature of the Public–Private Inquiry  
The difficulty posed by state action cases begins to resolve as soon 
as one understands the problem as primarily one of selection between 
different bodies of governing Constitutional Law, each designed to 
govern a different institutional type. Our legal system cannot avoid 
performing this selection. The question is how, not whether, it should be 
done. 
Some state action theories deny that there is a coherent and desirable 
selection method but instead argue that courts should have ad hoc 
authority in exceptional cases to govern private actors as though they 
were public.
75
 Such theories often attack the coherency of the public–
private distinction, noting, for example, that every time the collective 
enforces a private contract, there is public action.
76
 By denying the 
existence of a truly private sphere that ought to be immune from public 
Constitutional Law, this approach would give courts the power to 
perform the selection on a case-by-case basis, in each instance asking 
directly which body of metalaw would yield the better result. If no 
dispute settled by collective coercion is ever purely private, and if any 
public involvement is sufficient to give courts the power to import 
public Constitutional Law principles, then, indeed, there are only state 
action cases, not state action principles.  
                                                                                                                     
 75. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 551 (proposing that courts discard the state 
action doctrine and instead ―balance the rights of the violator and victim‖ and apply the 
Constitution whenever ―a person‘s rights were unjustifiably infringed,‖ no matter the public or 
private status of the infringer). 
 76. Id. at 525–26; see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (―[I]n granting judicial 
enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the 
equal protection of the laws . . . .‖). 
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This nihilistic denial of the possibility of distinguishing public and 
private leads us down the wrong path. It mistakes a tractable but 
multidimensional problem for an indeterminate, single dimensional one. 
It sees an undifferentiated mass of metal where the trained and careful 
eye would see separate but cooperating components of an engine. The 
key is this: If we are careful to avoid the trap of describing law or some 
practice as public or private in general and instead focus on whether a 
public or a private entity is the source of a particular decision, much of 
the perceived incoherency of the distinction falls away. 
For example, the substance of a private contract is created not by the 
collective but according to private will. The public will choose to back 
such private legislation with public coercion if certain publicly imposed 
conditions, those of private Constitutional Law, are met.
77
 Thus, 
concededly, law‘s product, the ultimate decision whether to use 
collective coercive capacities (such as fines, damages, injunctions, or 
imprisonment), is indeterminately public or private. It is both. But it is a 
composition of separate public and private decisions. Decomposing that 
product into the antecedent decisions leading to it resolves much of the 
indeterminacy and permits analysis of the rules governing those 
separate exercises of public and private power that combine to yield a 
judgment. 
For this reason, observing, as Shelley did, that the public is 
―involved‖ in enforcing a privately made law is not an appealing ground 
for applying public Constitutional Law. Advocates of finding state 
action on this basis justify using public constitutional rules meant to 
govern the making of one decision (what the content of a law should be) 
because the public was involved in a different decision (whether and 
how to coerce compliance). But private constitutional rules are tuned to 
protect the public interest when private parties make law. There is no 
justification to use rules meant to govern the public creation of law on 
account of the public‘s involvement in enforcing law that is already 
made.
78
 
                                                                                                                     
 77. As with publicly made legislation, private legislation is often the subject of 
interpretation. The fact that courts will sometimes decide between competing meanings of 
privately drafted text does not alter the fact that the source of the text was a private entity, acting 
according to a private will. In this sense, the criticism that courts—through interpretation—
render supposedly private legislation public recapitulates the debate over the judicial role in 
interpreting public legislation. 
 78. Obviously, constitutional rules applicable to enforcement, which ought to be 
calibrated to protect against institutional failures likely to arise from public enforcement, would 
apply to the activity of enforcement. The point here is that public constitutional rules applicable 
to lawmaking are not suited to govern private lawmaking, given the different institutional 
characteristics of private lawmakers. So if we are to apply public constitutional rules to the act 
of private lawmaking, there must be some other reason to do so than public enforcement. 
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Is there, then, ever a reason to apply public Constitutional Law to 
private-law creation? The answer lies in asking the right question: not 
whether there is some sufficient quantum of public involvement, but 
whether a particular act of private lawmaking is adequately governed by 
private Constitutional Law. 
Private Constitutional Law is particularized in a legal system by 
rules guarding against the stereotypical problems of private lawmaking. 
Public Constitutional Law is a set of specifications and constraints 
designed to avert the stereotypical problems of public lawmaking. The 
state action dilemma arises when we are unsure which body of 
Constitutional Law to apply. The institutional state action doctrine I 
propose here is a functional response to this instance of the 
Categorization Problem, one that aims to pair acts of lawmaking with 
the type of Constitutional Law that is most appropriate for the 
lawmaking institution at issue. Deciding whether there is state action is, 
at bottom, a problem of matching law with an institutionally tuned, 
governing metalaw. The work of the theory lies in describing the 
institutional parameters that should be used to make this selection.  
Since my focus is on the application of such an institutional state 
action theory in U.S. law, which divides regulatory power amongst 
multiple, public institutions, we must address an additional question: 
How should responsibility for solving this Categorization Problem be 
allocated to different public institutions? A primary contribution of my 
approach is that it makes clear that state action cases involve two very 
different, but still inherently institutional questions: (1) whether the 
private lawmaking actor is poorly governed by ordinary private 
Constitutional Law and (2) whether courts should remedy a mismatch 
or leave the problem to other public institutions. 
2.  The First Step: State Action Problems 
A state action problem, as I define the term, arises when the 
secondary rules governing an apparently private decision maker are a 
poor fit because the decision maker‘s potential institutional defects 
more closely resemble those of public entities than those of private 
ones. I will not attempt to characterize all the circumstances in which 
state action problems, so defined, might arise. Rather, I will focus on 
what I suspect is their overwhelmingly dominant source: private rules 
that have coercive effects on non-consenting others.  
Private lawmaking is generally premised on the existence of an 
agreement among a group of private lawmakers who will be the only 
ones governed by the law they make. It is universal consent that vitiates 
the ordinary distributive and calculation incompetencies of private 
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parties.
79
 In societies that place great value on individual welfare, like 
ours, a privately made law accords with the preferences of the collective 
because it is desired by all those who will be obligated by it and places 
obligations on no one else. Put differently, self-interested, private 
legislation aligns with the collective good when and only when it has 
the consent of all those with significant interests in it. 
In contrast, public lawmaking is a collective‘s mechanism for 
creating rules that govern its members without obtaining unanimous 
consent. Self-interested lawmakers are anathema to this process, as they 
may make laws disproportionately serving their own interests and with 
poor understanding of the interests of others. A primary concern of the 
second principle in public Constitutional Law is to scrutinize legislative 
output that is likely infected with these incompetencies, despite first-
principle-based efforts to constitute legislatures to avoid such problems. 
Laws burdening groups and movements with little political 
representation are perfect examples of targets for second-principle 
scrutiny, as electoral incentives may not adequately stand in for truly 
internalizing the preferences of such groups.
80
 
Given the divergent concerns and methods of private and public 
Constitutional Law, we should expect legal systems to have a hard time 
handling privately made laws that, on the one hand, comply with the 
formal enactment procedures for private law (valid contracts, for 
example), and yet, on the other hand, impose burdens on nonparties 
without their consent. The former aspect of such laws argues for 
application of private Constitutional Law, but the latter aspect justifies 
resort to public Constitutional Law. This is the Categorization Problem 
lurking behind the state action doctrine. 
The heart of the difficulty is that Constitutional Law is specifically 
adapted to the very different sources of institutional failure arising in 
private and public lawmaking institutions. Applying private secondary 
rules to a lawmaking institution that is more prone to the defects of 
public institutions would be a mistake at the legal system‘s very core, 
like using a recipe to make bread but with the ingredients to make a 
salad. Inappropriate categorization frustrates the primary purpose of the 
system‘s secondary rules: to help ensure an institution‘s decisions are 
competent as measured against public norms. 
                                                                                                                     
 79. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 80. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 76–77 (1980). Again, the claim is not that all such laws are in fact the product of 
incompetent lawmakers. But laws that place special burdens on those who are poorly 
represented do pose that danger, sufficiently so that more careful scrutiny of whether competent 
lawmaking could produce such a law is warranted. 
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 It may help to restate the functional, institutional criterion in 
doctrinally oriented terms. Private action that amounts to public 
legislation creates a state action problem. When private individuals 
make law for others, it becomes relevant whether they have acted 
adequately on those others‘ behalf, just as it is relevant for public 
legislatures. The consent among the enactors is a poor proxy for the 
overall public impact of the law. If we choose to allow such lawmaking 
at all (and our legal system sometimes does), the controls of public 
Constitutional Law are a much better fit for ex post, second principle 
review. 
I say these sorts of laws raise state action ―problems‖ because simple 
application of ordinary private Constitutional Law would poorly govern 
the lawmaker. It is a description of the law, in negative terms, but not in 
itself an answer to what should be done. The work of this first step of 
the institutional state action doctrine is both to flag instances of private 
lawmaking for the second step and to signal to other public institutions 
the need for importing, if possible, supplementary public Constitutional 
Law rules into the secondary law governing the problematic category of 
cases. After all, the private constitutional rules were not designed to 
guard, as public metalaw is, against poor agency and self-interested 
redistribution. The dangers of poor private calculation and distributive 
disadvantage are typically averted by those first-principle rules in 
private Constitutional Law requiring voluntarism among the parties. 
When applied to private Constitutional Law, the second principle, 
which examines legislative outputs (the contracts or other private rules 
themselves), yields only the loose, highly deferential constraints of 
unconscionability and public policy.
81
 The first step of the analysis tells 
us that more is needed. 
Somewhat curiously, the sprawling state action literature is mostly 
barren of what seems to be an intuitive and attractive formulation of 
state action: that it exists when private citizens legislate for others. 
While none provides a detailed, institutional justification for such a rule, 
a few articles have gestured in this direction. In an excellent student 
note, Dilan Esper, after finding existing theories wanting for reasons I 
mostly share, indicated a possible ―collective action‖ rationale for 
finding state action.
82
 As Esper put it, Shelley might be justified by an 
argument that ―a town cannot do through collective private action what 
it is disallowed to do publicly. Thus, since zoning by race is 
                                                                                                                     
 81. As we will see in Part III, these highly deferential forms of ex post review are 
nonetheless sufficiently malleable to permit courts to solve state action problems without 
resorting explicitly to public constitutional doctrines. 
 82. Esper, supra note 42, at 677–708, 715. 
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unconstitutional, a system of enforceable covenants that segregate 
neighborhoods is also impermissible.‖83 
This position comes closer than most to the institutional theory 
advanced here. Yet, it lacks the critical second step of the analysis to 
which I will turn next. Moreover, it is not much more than a brief 
animation of an intuition, albeit a correct intuition that embeds further 
assumptions about institutions, assumptions I have endeavored to make 
more explicit. But Esper‘s suggestion at least focuses on the right initial 
question: Are private individuals acting collectively to bind non-
consenting others? This is, again, a doctrinal statement that can be 
derived as a consequence of a more fundamental commitment. That 
commitment is to proper governance by secondary law when that law is 
generally tailored to the stereotypical attributes of the institutions to 
which it applies. 
Carol Rose also has entertained the private takeover of legislative 
capacity as a possible ground for state action in her analysis of 
Shelley.
84
 ―Widespreadness and inescapability—these were the aspects 
of [racially restrictive covenants] that made them seem so much like a 
private takeover of governmental functions; it was a takeover in which 
ostensibly private persons used the courts seriously to disadvantage 
racial minorities.‖85 Indeed, this captures a key circumstance in which 
the institutional criterion of the first step will be met. When exit is 
extremely difficult and the need is great, private providers will have 
substantial coercive capacity, and the rules they make tend toward 
legislation. 
In the next Part, I will apply both steps of the institutional theory to 
actual cases, and I will compare the answers given by the theory to 
those given by other approaches. But first, let us briefly consider a 
couple of examples of private laws (Contract Law within the public–
private theory) that raise state action problems, often without generating 
state action cases. 
a.  Covenants 
Covenants are an odd species of contract. They are, like ordinary 
contracts, agreements between parties that are binding on the parties 
themselves.
86
 But they have the special characteristic that they can also 
bind successors in interest of the contracting landowners, a feature 
known as ―running with the land.‖87 Parties to a covenant that runs with 
                                                                                                                     
 83. Id. at 715 (citation omitted). 
 84. Rose, supra note 3, at 171–72. 
 85. Id. at 195. 
 86. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Etc. § 1 (2012). 
 87. Id. § 19. I use the term ―covenant‖ to refer to real covenants and equitable servitudes, 
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the land are making law not only for themselves but also for future 
landowners. 
This arrangement presents a state action problem for the simple 
reason that not all those who will be bound by the private contract are 
parties to it.
88
 It is true that future landowners consent in a fashion, as 
they are only bound if they take the property with notice of the 
covenant.
89
 This voluntarism is a bit illusory, however. To change the 
law under which they live, parties subject to a covenant must often 
obtain the consent of all those with a right to enforce it.
90
 In cases in 
which the original lands have been subdivided, this can present a burden 
difficult to surmount.  
But if running with the land were impossible, it would be difficult to 
enter private arrangements relating to the use of land, as performance is 
often best rendered by the occupant, not the now-departed, original 
contracting party. At its core, running with the land allocates the cost of 
transaction to parties wishing to free themselves of a law, while not 
running with the land allocates it to parties wishing to continue the law. 
As others have noted,
91
 permitting private parties to make laws 
governing their lands that will be binding on successors poses a host of 
dangers. On the one hand, binding successors is necessary to make 
covenants effective, but on the other, it can impose unwanted burdens 
on successors who desire to live on the land but not under its law. 
Because there is some degree of consent by those who will be bound 
by covenants and because it is difficult to imagine effective law 
between the parties without running with the land, a case can be made 
for private lawmaking beyond the contracting parties. But because the 
law affects others, the secondary law governing such lawmaking should 
surely be different than ordinary private Constitutional Law, which is 
tuned for and assumes voluntarism. 
The common law has struck upon a solution. It has incorporated into 
private Constitutional Law a publicly derived principle meant to 
measure lawmaker agency. Traditionally, covenants have been required 
to ―touch and concern the land‖ in order to run.92 If the substance of the 
agreement does not meet this standard, no voluntary acts of the parties 
                                                                                                                     
agreements that, however enforced, run with the land. 
 88. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 3, at 195–97. 
 89. See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Etc. § 255 (discussing the general requirement of 
notice). 
 90. Id. at § 225. 
 91. See Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of Touch and Concern, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 925, 942 (―[B]ecause of the market and the players, mistakes will likely be 
frequent, large, and costly for the successors to undo . . . .‖). 
 92. See, e.g., 1 TIFFANY REAL PROP. § 126 (2012). 
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can otherwise create it. At its most useful, the doctrine requires that the 
parties have entered into the agreement because of their generic status 
as landowners, not as individuals. That is, a contract touches and 
concerns the land when it would benefit and burden any owners of the 
lands in question.
93
 This criterion is, at bottom, a test to determine 
whether the private lawmakers are likely good agents for those who will 
succeed them. 
In terms of the core competencies,
94
 while a current landowner is not 
particularly likely to be a good calculator of the preferences his 
successor will have generally, he may be better when it comes to 
preferences concerning the use of the land, as to which he and the 
successor will be more similarly situated. In addition, it provides some 
comfort that when it comes to enacting land-specific obligations, the 
current owner will be more likely to satisfy the preferences of 
successors when he must shoulder the same obligations and personally 
suffer any diminished property value in exchange for the benefits the 
covenant regime provides. As to these preferences, he is reasonably 
likely to be a good agent, whereas we would assume no such 
competence in binding successors to arbitrary contractual arrangements 
that do not primarily concern the important asset the covenanting parties 
and his successors have in common.  
In sum, private covenants that run with the land are instances of 
private laws that will bind others than the enactors, a potential state 
action problem. The common law has adopted a substantive 
requirement for validity, a second-principle-derived bit of private 
Constitutional Law that is modeled after the agency-policing aspect of 
public Constitutional Law. Recognizing that these contracts bind others, 
we test the legislative output for indicia of good agency—that the 
enactors are especially likely to be representative of their successors. 
And in this way this corner of Contract Law has adapted to solve a state 
action problem. 
b.  Common-Interest Communities 
Consider next the case of common-interest communities, including 
homeowners‘ associations (HOAs) and condominium associations. 
These are governing bodies established by covenants, usually called a 
―declaration‖ in this context, in a neighborhood or condominium.95 
Unlike covenants containing only substantive rights and obligations 
(primary rules), declarations also contain secondary rules, often 
                                                                                                                     
 93. Id. 
 94. See Turner, supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000). 
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constituting a board that will have ongoing rulemaking authority.
96
 The 
contracting parties creating such an arrangement, and successors in 
interest, agree to be bound by future rules made by the privately 
established board.
97
 
Quite obviously, board-passed rules are privately made and bind 
others than the enactors. We therefore should expect a state action 
problem, a mismatch between ordinary private Constitutional Law, 
which insists on and then assumes consent, and the sorts of defects that 
could befall the private lawmaking body. Because rules passed by the 
board do not require the consent of every property owner, even in the 
weaker sense of taking property with notice of such rules, there is a 
potential that self-interested lawmaking could occur and produce 
inefficient results. 
Recognizing potential private calculation and distributive problems, 
states have placed restrictions on this form of private lawmaking. There 
are procedural restrictions, first-principle-derived rules meant to 
produce lawmaking entities more likely to be atomically competent. 
Given the similarity of the institutional problem, it should not be 
surprising that these rules require boards to be selected and operated 
somewhat like democratically elected legislatures.
98
 After all, these 
first-principle-derived rules are, in each setting, attempting to solve ex 
ante the agency problems inherent in making law for others. 
Of more interest for the present Article, though, are the second-
principle-derived metalaws special to these arrangements. Unlike 
private lawmakers entering a covenant, HOA boards offer no assurance 
even of initial competence. The board does not itself feel, as 
covenanting parties do, even all the initial effects of the laws it makes. 
Some of the costs of its rules will immediately be borne by others. And 
so, it must be a good agent not only for successors in interest but for 
other members of the HOA whose consent will not be required for its 
laws to go into effect.
99
 The board, therefore, is in precisely the situation 
of any public legislature, and we have an obvious state action problem. 
                                                                                                                     
 96. See id. § 6.16 (stating governing board‘s authority to exercise power to bind 
members).  
 97. See id. 
 98. See GARY A. POLIAKOFF, 1 LAW OF CONDOMINIUM OPERATIONS § 1:14. The 
Restatement (Third) of Property states: ―[A]n association in a common-interest community is 
governed by a board elected by its [memhers]. The board is entitled to exercise all powers of the 
community except those reserved to the members.‖ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
SERVITUDES § 6.16 (2000).  
 99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.14 (2000) (explaining duties of 
directors and officers of common-interest communities to act in good faith, to act in compliance 
with law and declaration, to deal fairly, and to use ordinary care and prudence). 
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The move the law has made has been to permit such private 
lawmaking but to subject it to second-principle analysis characteristic of 
public Constitutional Law. Board-passed rules are subject to judicial 
review for reasonableness.
100
 There is considerable debate as to how 
deferential this review should be, but it is surely more rigorous than the 
default private Constitutional Law standard of unconscionability. While 
a claim of unconscionability is likely to fail when the facts (procedural 
and substantive) do not cast suspicion on the voluntary nature of the 
contract, a claim that a board-passed rule is unreasonable goes to the 
substantive merits of the rule.
101
 In addition to general review for 
reasonableness, legislatures and courts have imported more specific 
public principles into review of board-passed rules, including 
prohibitions on rules limiting speech, assembly, and religion.
102
 
As with the general case of covenants that run with the land, private 
laws made in common-interest communities present an obvious state 
action problem. Legislatures and courts have responded predictably by 
importing those minimal first- (ex ante, procedural) and second- (ex 
post, substantive) principle constraints from public Constitutional Law 
needed to avert it. 
                                                                                                                     
 100. See id. § 6.7; see also, e.g., Johnson v. Hobson, 505 A.2d 1313, 1319 (D.C. 1986) 
(assessing the reasonableness of a rule prohibiting unit owners from parking cars without 
current registration); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1975) (describing the test for rules adopted by condominium associations as one of 
reasonableness). 
 101. Exactly how deferential this substantive review should be is a matter of some 
disagreement, with some jurisdictions adopting something like the business judgment rule, 
which mainly looks for substance indicative of self-dealing, and others doing more aggressive 
cost–benefit-style second guessing. See Paula A. Franzese, Common Interest Communities: 
Standards of Review and Review of Standards, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 663, 676–97 (2000) 
(discussing different levels of substantive review). The institutional theory of state action 
suggests that the latter might normally be the better approach, unless living within a community 
is a stronger than normal signal of voluntary submission to the types of rule at issue. I have in 
mind here religious communities and perhaps others bound together by conscience more than by 
ordinary property preferences. See generally Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 
VA. L. REV. 1889, 1967–71 (2005). 
 102. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1353.6 (West 2007) (barring, with some exceptions, 
common-interest developments from ―prohibit[ing] posting or displaying of noncommercial 
signs, posters, flags, or banners‖); FLA. STAT. § 718.123(1) (2010) (―No [condominium] shall 
unreasonably restrict any unit owner‘s right to peaceably assemble or right to invite public 
officers or candidates for public office to appear and speak in common elements, common areas, 
and recreational facilities.‖); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.4(h) (2010) (―[N]o [condominium] 
rule or regulation may impair any rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States . . . .‖). 
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3.  The Second Step: Judicial Intervention 
As the examples above illustrate, a circumstance that presents a 
problem for a legal system does not necessarily have a single solution. 
In fact, it may not even present a problem that must be solved. 
Problematic cases create tension in legal systems, exerting some 
pressure for a better justified doctrine. But that is a long way from 
saying that the legal system must respond in a particular way. The 
existence of a state action problem does not logically imply that courts 
must be free to apply public Constitutional Law to formally private 
lawmaking. That could be one solution, but, like other potential 
solutions, it carries costs. Judicial resolution must therefore be justified, 
not assumed as valid or appropriate. 
The institutional perspective allows us to see that legal systems do in 
fact respond to state action problems in several ways other than through 
a judicially administered state action doctrine. The response to state 
action problems can and has come from legislatures, common law 
courts, states, and the federal government.
103
 Viewing the problem this 
way, it becomes clear that the application by a federal court of the state 
action doctrine to cure a state action problem is a last resort. The 
doctrine steps in to apply public constitutional rules only if all other 
public entities have failed to supply secondary rules responsive to the 
peculiar failings of the private institution in front of it, and I will argue 
perhaps not even then. 
The state action doctrine as we know it is, therefore, a body of law 
intended to solve a coupled problem of institutional regulation. First, is 
the lawmaking at issue, though formally private, so unlike stereotypical 
private conduct or lawmaking that the institutional controls of ordinary, 
private Constitutional Law are inadequate? Second, is there a reason for 
courts to attempt to solve the problem by imposing the public 
Constitutional Law it applies to public lawmaking? 
This second question is a weighty one, and it is impossible to make 
sense of our state action doctrine without paying careful attention to it. 
When should federal courts take it upon themselves to attempt to solve 
the constitutional mismatch by finding state action and imposing public 
Constitutional Law on private actors? A reasonable state action doctrine 
would apply public constitutional rules when (1) analysis of the first 
question reveals there is a state action problem and (2) endemic 
institutional failures prevent other public institutions from supplying 
more appropriate secondary rules for which public Constitutional Law 
is an acceptable substitute. Resort by federal courts to a meat cleaver 
                                                                                                                     
 103. See supra Subsection II.B.2.a–b (discussing legislative and common law responses to 
state actionstate action problems of covenants and common-interest communities).  
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when perhaps a scalpel is all that is required surely ought to be rare, 
and, indeed, it is. 
The examples of state action problems discussed in the last 
Subsection demonstrate the desirability of forbearance by constitutional 
courts in favor of smaller-scale adjustment by other lawmaking bodies. 
Classes of like cases raising state action problems, such as HOA 
disputes, can be addressed by modestly importing only certain elements 
of public Constitutional Law. Where private legislation notwithstanding 
unavoidable state action problems is desirable and a category of such 
legislation is identifiable, a special class of metalaw can be developed. 
The state action doctrine, though, is used to decide cases in which 
state action problems fall all the way through the system, unremedied 
by other legislative or judicial efforts. When all available metalaw has 
been exhausted but still found wanting, what is a court to do? If the only 
option left is to apply public Constitutional Law, declaring the 
lawmaking entity a public one despite its formal status, should the court 
take that dramatic step to remedy the state action problem? 
The position of a court confronting an unresolved state action 
problem is similar to that of a court confronting Equal Protection 
analysis of a legislatively imposed inequality. The issue in that case is 
not simply whether there is an inequality, for all laws create 
inequalities, but whether it is the kind that justifies a court‘s overriding 
an existing legislative choice and eliminating the possibility of a future 
legislative remedy.
104
 
The relevance of comparative institutional analysis for the state 
action doctrine has been noted by David Strauss, who observed that 
―expanding the category of ‗state action‘ is a way of putting the courts 
in charge of a problem.‖105 Strauss then explained that the Carolene 
Products theory of the Equal Protection Clause—focusing scrutiny on 
those suspicious laws that disadvantage political minorities—should 
also ―influence[] the interpretation of the state action doctrine‖ on 
account of ―courts‘ superior capacity to deal with race discrimination 
issues.‖106 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Cf. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.3(a)(i) (4th ed. 2008) (discussing the Court‘s considerations in 
determining whether to override legislative choices under Equal Protection analysis). 
 105. David A. Strauss, State Action after the Civil Rights Era, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 409, 
413 (1993). 
 106. Id. (referring to Justice Harlan F. Stone‘s famous footnote 4 in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (―It is unnecessary to consider 
now . . . whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied 
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.‖ (citations omitted))). 
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Strauss has it right. The very same tertiary doctrines that guide 
courts in reviewing discriminatory laws should serve to define their role 
in applying the state action doctrine. In both contexts, after all, the 
concern is with relative institutional capacity to ensure adherence to 
constitutional commitments. This two-step institutional theory of state 
action tells us when, how, and why courts should consider their 
institutional competence. The political failure in state action cases lies 
in the appearance of unregulated private laws that present state action 
problems. Put another way, the courts must look for situations in which 
private Constitutional Law inadequately regulates private lawmaking. 
But spotting such a situation, like spotting a law that discriminates, is 
insufficient. In both cases, courts must then decide whether they are 
better positioned than other institutions to remedy the situation.
107
 And 
Carolene Products, as Strauss indicated,
108
 provides a reason and 
method for doing so. 
I proceed from the assumption that the development of private 
Constitutional Law, including invalidating private efforts that amount to 
public legislation, ought generally to be left to legislatures and, 
secondarily, to administrative agencies and common law courts, both of 
which are subject to legislative override. This starting point is justified 
by a prior commitment to political branch prerogative over political 
decisions, including those affecting the line between collective and 
individual control over society. 
III.  A COMPARISON OF THE THEORIES IN ACTION 
The previous Part introduced the institutional state action doctrine, a 
two-step institutional analysis. Legal systems generally require 
secondary rules that supply solutions to the problem of classifying 
lawmaking actors as public or private. Breaking the problem into a first-
stage analysis of the characteristics of the lawmaking entity 
(identification of state action problems) and a second-stage analysis of 
comparative institutional advantage in providing a solution (deciding 
whether courts should intervene) may not make every hard case easy, 
but it at least has the advantage of helping us to understand why they 
are hard. 
In this Part, I explain how the institutional state action theory is in 
practice reflected in the American legal system and how it can be 
                                                                                                                     
 107. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 104, § 18.3(a)(i) (―To the extent that the 
Justices independently determine whether the law has a purpose which conforms to the 
Constitution and whether the classification in fact relates to that purpose, the Justices are taking 
the position that the Court is able to assess these issues in a manner superior to, or at least 
different from, the determination of the legislature.‖). 
 108. See infra Section III.A. 
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further integrated. I argue that the Supreme Court‘s state action 
decisions have largely, but not entirely, stumbled upon the correct 
solutions. In doing so, they may appear unprincipled, but this is only 
because they in fact grapple with each of the two steps of the 
institutional state action theory despite talking as though there is but 
one. 
Although the Court has offered a variety of these arguments to 
support the line of state action decisions, none is sufficient to account 
for it. The institutional approach clears much of the confusion by 
disaggregating the two different inquiries. For example, the two-step 
approach explains why cases involving racial discrimination are more 
appropriate targets for state action findings in a way that few other 
theories can. 
A.  Taxonomy 
The Court and commentators have provided a number of rhetorical 
positions that might map onto theoretical commitments underlying the 
state action doctrine. I label these Doctrinal Factors, Pure Balancing, 
Substance-Sensitive Balancing, State Support, Formal Identification, 
and Power. Each fails to capture important intuitions the others identify. 
And each attempts to paper over the difficult problems, either by 
ignoring them and making peace with instances of poor governance or 
by devolving them to courts to handle on an ad hoc basis. Another 
approach, recently pursued by Vikram Amar,
109
 comes closest to the 
analysis I propose here. It is, laudably, functional in nature and 
appropriately enlarges the range of intuitions to consult in thinking 
about state action cases to include, among other things, institutional 
concerns.
110
 
1.  Doctrinal Factors 
The first approach is an umbrella under which the other state action 
theoretical intuitions can be deployed as needed. It looks for 
touchstones of state action, components that can be balanced—though 
not a pure balance of rights like the balancing approaches I discuss 
below. Recall that the Supreme Court has identified diverse pathways to 
finding state action, including various forms of state participation and 
the performance by the putative state actor of a ―public function.‖111 
                                                                                                                     
 109. See generally Amar, supra note 6, at 424–29 (arguing that certain functional 
considerations present a preferable approach to state action analysis). 
 110. See id. 
 111. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass‘n, 531 U.S. 288, 295–96 
(2001). 
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Even after one of these routes proves to be available, state action is 
not found when competing values of sufficient weight exist. In 
Brentwood, Justice Souter cited a case involving a public defender 
acting within the scope of her duties.
112
 Public employment would 
normally qualify as a sufficient nexus to find state action, but in Polk 
County v. Dodson, the public defender was employed as the state‘s 
adversary rather than its agent.
113
  
Other relevant factors might include the monopoly position of the 
actor,
114
 the degree to which the action interferes with some important, 
constitutionally significant policy, the coercive power of the private 
entity, and the nature of the rights at stake on each side of the litigation. 
Some of these, as discussed below, are the hearts of theories urged as 
replacements for the Court‘s ad hoc approach. 
The deficiency of this method of finding state action is clear. Not 
only does it fail to identify the institutional problems that functionally 
justify the doctrine, but it does not specify a method at all. The ad hoc 
approach is, essentially, a delegation to judges to use intuition—the sort 
of solution one might strike upon to resolve a problem that seems too 
complex for an algorithm but as to which ―knowing it when you see it‖ 
seems to work most of the time. The true effect, though, is to generate 
politically acceptable answers in difficult and charged state action cases. 
2.  Power 
The Power theories posit that public constitutional norms ought to 
apply to ―powerful‖ private entities. ―Power‖ is a relative term, and 
might refer either to (1) the quality of the power a private entity wields 
or (2) the extent to which a private entity can control other private 
parties. Examples of the former include arguments that there exists a 
category of functions that are inherently governmental. When a private 
party exercises such governmental powers, it is their quality as 
governmental that causes a court to apply public constitutional 
norms.
115
 The Supreme Court found state action in Terry v. Adams, 
citing the governmental nature of the power of a private organization 
that had de facto authority over candidates for election.
116
 But in Flagg 
                                                                                                                     
 112. Id. at 303 (discussing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)). 
 113. Id. at 303–04. 
 114. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159–60 (1978) (noting the importance of the 
monopolistic position in public function analysis). 
 115. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The ―Government Function‖ 
and ―Power Theory‖ Approaches, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 757, 776–77 (1979); Ralph K. Winter, 
Jr., Changing Concepts of Equality: From Equality Before the Law to the Welfare State, 1979 
WASH. U. L. Q. 741, 744 (1979). 
 116. 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953). 
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Bros. and Jackson, the Supreme Court found that private exercises of 
arguably governmental functions were not sufficient on their own to 
constitute state action.
117
 
The latter type of power theory, focusing on the extent that a private 
party has power over other parties, certainly overlaps the former. Rather 
than focus on the kinds of powers governments typically have, it is 
fundamentally concerned with ensuring constitutional constraints on de 
facto coercive authority.
118
 Coercion, not traditional governmental 
functions, is the criterion for finding state action. 
Power theories are on the right track, but the structural theory more 
precisely describes and handles the source of the state action difficulty. 
Very often, ―powerful‖ private actors and combinations of such actors 
can be coercive in a way that mirrors legislative command. But there are 
at least two problems with letting the solution to the Categorization 
Problem turn solely on an estimate of the private party‘s power. 
First, ―power‖ is an imprecise term. A powerful private actor may be 
one that can easily accomplish its own ends, but it may not have a 
legislative-like ability to coerce other private parties. Some large 
corporations, for example, are powerful in the sense that they dominate 
their respective markets, obtaining perhaps the best deals on supplies, 
but not in the sense that they can coerce others. Like fuzzy inquiries into 
whether a course of conduct is generally public or private, asking 
whether an entity is powerful asks many questions at once and invites 
conflicting answers, with no criteria for sifting among them for the 
answer most responsive to the concerns animating the inquiry in the 
first place.
119
 
But even if power is understood to mean the ability to control a 
significant portion of the community, the power theory does no more 
than identify potential state action problems. Because the power theory 
is not rooted in a deeper understanding of the institutional problems 
behind the state action inquiry, it may not even do a good job of that. 
Looking for power or coercion should be proxies for the real inquiry: 
whether the private actor is inadequately regulated by private 
Constitutional Law. After all, Contract Law already makes the 
                                                                                                                     
 117. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 161 (finding no state action on grounds that ―the settlement 
of disputes between debtors and creditors is not traditionally an exclusive public function‖ 
(emphasis added)); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352–53 (1974) (declining to 
find state action concerning privately owned utility company providing essential public service). 
 118. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection 
of Personal Rights From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 942–51 
(1952) (analyzing the theory that large corporations, because they are creatures of the state and 
exert great economic control over the citizenry, should be subject to constitutional restraints). 
 119. See infra Subsection III.B.1. 
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enforcement of contracts contingent on voluntarism and includes 
prohibitions on unconscionable contracts or those entered under duress. 
Powerful entities in competition for customers are often not in a 
position to dictate terms to those customers. The point here is that 
economic power, as such, is not sufficient to show the existence of a 
state action problem. To the extent that it is used as an indicator, it must 
be remembered that it is only evidence of the problem but is not itself 
the problem. 
At least, though, conditioning state action on a private party‘s 
possession of power is roughly aligned with the underlying institutional 
question—if power is understood as the ability to gain the compliance 
of others without true consent. Its imprecision, though, is compounded 
by the theory‘s failure to provide guidance to courts as to whether they, 
as opposed to other institutions, should regulate the private power at 
issue. It misses the second step of the two-part state action theory. 
The power theory conceives of Constitutional Law horizontally, as a 
separate body of rights-protecting provisions that at the very least 
constrains public agents but that has no direct similarity to private 
contract law. It does not understand public Constitutional Law as a 
regulatory option parallel to the private Constitutional Law of our 
contract law, one that serves the same purposes but with a different 
institutional target.
120
 Perhaps for this reason, the theory is not 
expansive enough to allow courts to forbear finding state action when 
other institutions are sufficiently competent to amend the private 
Constitutional Law that would ordinarily govern. In short, the power 
theory—because it does not fully comprehend the institutional 
problem—fails to distinguish the problem of poorly regulated private 
entities from the question of whether courts are the proper public bodies 
to solve that problem. 
3.  Balancing 
Balancing theories treat the state action question as a question of 
costs and benefits. Applying public constitutional constraints to a 
private actor imposes autonomy-restricting obligations on that actor; for 
example, by restricting the actor‘s ability to discriminate among 
potential business associates. On the other hand, not applying those 
constraints permits private actors to impose burdens on others. A 
balancing theory attempts to pick an optimal regulatory solution to this 
problem of alternative costs by asking a judge to weigh them.  
The key to this approach is a conviction that constitutional rights are 
positive entitlements. For example, a private employee who faces 
                                                                                                                     
 120. See supra Section II.A. 
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termination if he or she expresses certain political views has suffered an 
abridgment of his or her freedom of speech. Although the Constitution 
is not formally concerned with this type of abridgment, a balancing 
view understands this speech restriction as a constitutionally cognizable 
cost. When this cost is greater than the constitutional costs that would 
be realized by imposing public Constitutional Law on the adverse 
private actor, a balancing theory would find state action. 
Erwin Chemerinsky is perhaps the staunchest advocate of the 
balancing approach, arguing that the state action doctrine should be 
eliminated and replaced with a balancing test.
121
 But other 
commentators also have urged some form of balancing test.
122
 Pure 
balancing theories normally depend on denying the reality of a formal 
line between public and private action.
123
 The question of state action is, 
for these theorists, one of a policy concerning those competing personal 
interests that have resonance in the language of rights.  
As the Supreme Court put it in Marsh: ―Whether a corporation or a 
municipality owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an 
identical interest in the functioning of the community in such manner 
that the channels of communication remain free.‖124 Rights, in this 
formulation, are immunities that travel with the actor, guarding against 
involuntary abrogation from whatever the source, only yielding when 
weightier rights are at stake on the other side. 
A variation on the balancing theory, substance-sensitive balancing, 
also takes its cue from Marsh, and understands that the nature of the 
rights on either side is perhaps more important than any quantitative 
understanding of the degree of infringement of those rights. For 
example, the Court in Marsh stated, ―When we balance the 
Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people 
                                                                                                                     
 121. Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 506.  
 122. See, e.g., Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 37, at 7–8 (arguing that rather than 
searching for a unitary state action formula, courts should consider three aspects: (1) the 
personal interests of the parties; (2) the impact on these personal interests of a decision whether 
national authority may intervene; and (3) the effect of such a decision on the policy of 
encouraging local responsibility). 
 123. See, e.g., Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers 
v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1301 (1982) (noting that the state is implicated ―in every 
‗private‘ action not prohibited by law‖); Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 524 (―[S]tate action is 
present in all private violations of constitutional rights.‖); Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. 
Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment ―State Action‖ Requirement, 1976 
SUP. CT. REV. 221, 229–30 (1976) (arguing that a state permitting ―unconstitutional‖ private 
action no less deprives the injured citizen of his rights than a state affirmatively infringing on 
those rights). 
 124. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946). 
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to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain 
mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.‖125 
The rhetorical approach here suggests that while a balance is a 
―must,‖ the weights of rights on either side depend on their nature. The 
First Amendment rights of speakers, the Court observed, are 
―fundamental,‖ lying ―at the foundation of free government.‖126 On the 
other hand, the public-like operation of the property diminished the 
private property rights to exclude: ―The more an owner, for his 
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the 
more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and 
constitutional rights of those who use it.‖127 The Court argues that, in a 
balance of constitutionally cognizable harms, not all infringements are 
the same. 
The trouble with using a balancing approach illustrates the benefits 
of the institutional theory. First, as a theory of selecting between private 
and public Constitutional Law, it fails miserably. A balance of rights is 
likely to be insensitive to the institutional considerations that have led to 
the distinctions between the two bodies of secondary laws. Instead, the 
balancing focuses on the relative impact on the parties of the decision 
whether to apply public Constitutional Law rather than private 
Constitutional Law, without explicitly focusing on public Constitutional 
Law‘s comparative advantages and disadvantages to private 
Constitutional Law. While that determination could possibly replicate 
the suitability analysis I have urged, it would do so only indirectly while 
being resistant to rule-like formulations and the creation of categories. 
And weighing impacts to rights obscures, rather than illuminates, the 
state action doctrine; even a constitutional regulation that results in little 
cognizable harm to a state action defendant might be a very poor 
regulation, in that the state action defendant has no cognizable reason to 
serve as the agent of the plaintiff or the public at large.  
Second, the theory leaves no room for other institutions to solve state 
action problems in more finely tuned ways. Balancing would cause the 
state action determination to turn only on a judicial evaluation of 
competing rights. A critical aspect to resolving these difficult cases is 
the introspection and evaluation of the political landscape that the 
second step of the institutional analysis requires. Some balancing 
approaches would allow courts to consider such things,
128
 but it would 
be better to acknowledge that the second step is a threshold, not a factor. 
                                                                                                                     
 125. Id. at 509 (footnote omitted). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 506. 
 128. See, e.g., Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 37, at 34–35 (arguing for a consideration 
of the impact of finding state action on the policy of local control in a test that would otherwise 
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4.  Formal Identification 
Some commentators have rejected altogether courts‘ unilateral 
application of public constitutional principles to entities that are not 
formally public.
129
 For example, Richard Kay argues that the 
Constitution should protect individual rights only against abrogation by 
Congress, the President, and other state and federal agents acting under 
controlling law.
130
 Although this approach would represent a radical 
departure from the Court‘s doctrine, being inconsistent with Shelley and 
Marsh to name the most obvious examples, it is not entirely inconsistent 
with the abstract state action doctrine.  
The Formal approach does not deny the existence of state action 
problems, and it does not argue against regulations that import public 
constitutional principles to solve such problems. But it does deny that 
step two should, in a significant category of cases, be resolved to permit 
courts to provide such regulations. That, after all, is what step two does. 
It asks courts to resolve whether other institutions are capable of 
supplying needed public-oriented regulations on private actors and, if 
not, whether the courts are. One might believe courts should always 
resolve this in the negative on grounds that they are never better suited 
than other branches to solve the problem or on grounds that, perhaps 
empirically, there are almost always other institutions that, even if 
laboring under some detriment with respect to the question, have the 
capacity to provide responsive solutions. 
Terry and Shelley are but two important data points that help show 
why this view is mistaken. In each case, the existing private 
Constitutional Law was controlled by majoritarian forces that had an 
active interest in helping to subvert the goals of public Constitutional 
Law.
131
 Concerted private action was actually used as a substitute for 
legislation, while the governing private Constitutional Law was 
designed for other, more disaggregated forms of private action.
132
 But 
the reason this substitution was effective, the reason that other 
institutions failed to supplement the private Constitutional Law 
applicable to these defendants, was the complicity of the legislature, 
marking a failure of majoritarian politics to align private secondary 
                                                                                                                     
balance the harms of the decision to private parties). 
 129. See, e.g., John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 
N.C. L. REV. 569, 574 (2005) (advocating a formal approach to state action that recognizes 
―without exception that only governmental actors are subject to constitutional rules‖). 
 130. Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the 
Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 342–43 (1993).  
 131. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469–70 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19–20 
(1948).  
 132. Terry, 345 U.S. at 469; Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19–20. 
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rules with controlling public policy. These cases demonstrate the 
essential role that courts can and should play in those rare cases when 
serious state action problems are immune from political correction. 
Still, there has been support from the Supreme Court for this formal 
position, at least in some cases. Justice O‘Connor, in Lebron, appeared 
to have accepted it: ―[T]he conduct of a private actor is not subject to 
constitutional challenge if such conduct is ‗fundamentally a matter of 
private choice and not state action.‘‖133 Read too strongly, this would 
appear to contradict Shelley,
134
 but I do not think this was Justice 
O‘Connor‘s intent. Her position was, rather, a useful articulation of an 
intuition, one the institutional theory makes explicit: that courts may not 
normally be the best bodies to apply substantive, constitutional-type 
restrictions in areas ordinarily governed by private Constitutional Law. 
5.  Functional Theories 
More recent efforts to understand the state action miasma have made 
strides forward by focusing on function rather than debates over 
malleable, formal labels. Vikram Amar has set out three possible 
groundings for a functional state action theory, the first two of which 
are institutional in nature.
135
 First, he cites federalism as a possible 
reason to avoid expanding the category of actors against whom the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses apply.
136
 If these clauses‘ 
application is broad, then so too is Congress‘s enforcement power under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment—broad ―in a way that 
                                                                                                                     
 133. Lebron v. Nat‘l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 409 (1995) (O‘Connor, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O‘Connor, 
J., dissenting)). In the Establishment Clause context, Justice Thomas has similarly written in 
support of a strong, formal public–private distinction: ―If aid to schools, even ‗direct aid,‘ is 
neutrally available and, before reaching or benefiting any religious school, first passes through 
the hands (literally or figuratively) of numerous private citizens who are free to direct the aid 
elsewhere, the government has not provided any ‗support of religion.‘‖ Mitchell v. Helms, 530 
U.S. 793, 816 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 134. The obvious counterargument is that Shelley involved a willing buyer and willing 
seller, prevented from transacting by the state. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19. That, however, would be 
a formalistic evasion of what happened. The covenant at issue represented a regulatory right of a 
neighbor that would ordinarily be called a property right and enforced, regardless of the wishes 
of sellers and buyers. The dispute in Shelley arose because of the private choices of neighbors to 
grant each other regulatory rights regarding racial exclusion. 
 135. Amar, supra note 6, at 425–29. The third is that ―many constitutional rules would be 
unreasonably intrusive if we applied them to all private behavior,‖ and so the doctrine that 
insists on state action before applying them protects a ―cluster of privacy and autonomy 
considerations.‖ Id. at 429. That is indeed a function of the default categorization. At the least, it 
describes typical values behind the political choices concerning which activities should 
generally be left to Contract Law and its consent-based structure. 
 136. Id. at 425–26. 
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threatens local autonomy, experimentation, and compromise that 
considers and balances local conditions and complexities.‖137 Although 
Amar concludes that the breadth of Congress‘s power under the 
Commerce Clause currently renders this concern of little practical 
importance, it does echo the second step of the institutional theory.
138
 
His citation of separation of powers as a second functional justification 
goes even further in the direction of the second step.
139
 First noting the 
general preference for policymaking by legislatures, Amar echoes the 
justifications for the second step of the institutional theory: that 
legislatures are better at gathering data and crafting finely tuned rules 
that are more responsive to the detailed circumstances of the regulated 
actors.
140
 
This line of thinking is similar to the institutional approach. While 
Amar would use these functional considerations as part of a more ad 
hoc test,
141
 they at least focus on one important question: the wisdom of 
using courts to solve problems like those arising in the canonical state 
action cases. The full institutional theory tells us when and how Amar‘s 
justifications, among others, should be deployed. Examples help to 
demonstrate how this is so. 
B.  Institutional Theory in Action 
The distinctive character of the institutional theory is better 
appreciated with its application. I will briefly analyze the theory‘s 
application to several previously decided state action cases. In doing so, 
the contrast with existing theories and doctrine will become clear. The 
institutional theory, however, reaches even beyond state action. Once 
one understands the problem in state action cases to be one of 
mismatched primary and secondary rules, an obvious question arises: 
Are there formally public actions that would be better governed by 
private Constitutional Law? In other words, are there private action 
problems as well as state action problems? I close by arguing that there 
are. 
1.  Shelley 
Any state action theory must grapple with Shelley v. Kraemer, the 
paradigmatic case raising the Categorization Problem.
142
 First note that 
                                                                                                                     
 137. Id. at 426. 
 138. Id. at 426–27.  
 139. Id. at 427–28. 
 140. Id. at 428. 
 141. Id. at 433–37. 
 142. Esper went so far as to call it ―the Taj Mahal of state action problems.‖ Esper, supra 
note 42, at 715. 
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neither the formal identification theory nor an unmodified power theory 
would replicate the result in Shelley. Since the parties making and 
enforcing the covenants were undeniably private entities, the formal 
identification theory would clearly find that no state action existed. 
Although Shelley itself purported to find state action in a court‘s 
enforcement of a private covenant, if that were sufficient, all private 
agreements would be subject to public constitutional review before 
enforcement. Court enforcement was not a determinative reason for the 
decision in Shelley, and so the formal identification of the judge as the 
public actor is insufficient.  
The power theory likewise fails to harmonize with Shelley unless it 
is transformed into a collective-action principle resembling the first step 
of the institutional theory. The homeowners seeking to enforce the racist 
covenants in Shelley were not the sort of powerful private actors that the 
power theory imagines as state-like. Their coercive capacity, with 
respect to the issues in Shelley, extended only to a few properties. 
Again, if that were sufficient, the power theory would be a nullity, as 
every private agreement represents some quantum of power, represented 
by the consideration, on each side. 
To offer an effective but affirmative answer to the state action 
question in Shelley, therefore, the power theory would need a broad 
understanding of the entities that a court would analyze in a given case 
for state action-triggering power. If it were known that the widespread 
use of covenants made it virtually impossible for nonwhites to buy or 
occupy homes in white neighborhoods, then we could say that the 
market has served a coordinating function, delivering a near-uniform 
private rule authored by disaggregated private lawmakers. Perhaps the 
sort of power that triggers state action can be found not only in 
individually powerful private actors but in aggregations of market actors 
who collectively wield power over other market participants. 
This conception of the power theory begins to capture the essence of 
the first step of the institutional theory. The institutional theory is, first 
of all, more precise in its first step. It is not merely the power of the 
market in the abstract nor even its power to push a uniform rule that 
satisfies the first step, but the coercion to comply with that rule. In 
addition, the power theory would still suffer from the lack of a second 
step analyzing the institutional appropriateness of courts as state action 
problem solvers. This deficiency causes too much to turn on a finding of 
―power,‖ as doing so triggers public constitutional review even when 
such review is institutionally inappropriate. That is, it fails to 
distinguish those cases in which courts are needed to solve the problem 
from those in which they are not, and in which court involvement may 
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bar better, more finely tuned regulation.
143
 As a result, the theory would 
not be able to explain why race should be a trigger for finding state 
action. 
The problem is that if the power theory yields the result in Shelley it 
proves far too much, for it would dictate the application of public 
constitutional rules by courts in every instance of market-coordinated 
action by otherwise diffuse private actors. This does not match our 
practice, which finds no state action, for example, when markets deliver 
certain kinds of automobiles but not others, when markets settle on 
particular forms of transacting in real estate, or when a town supports a 
few newspapers, none of which are libertarian in viewpoint. None of 
these has been found to be state action, and the institutional theory 
would not label them state action either, for reasons that will be further 
examined below. 
In contrast to the Court‘s holding and other theoretical approaches, 
the institutional theory captures the essence of what is really 
bothersome about Shelley, distinguishing it from other instances of 
covenant enforcement. First, we ask whether the private rules that were 
enforced raised unresolved state action problems. As we have seen,
144
 
covenants that run with the land raise, generally, a state action problem. 
But this problem is cured by the agency-policing doctrines of, inter alia, 
touch and concern.  
Shelley, though, involved a further problem. The defect was not the 
binding, by an individual covenant, of future landowners by 
unrepresentative agents. Rather, there was a state action problem on 
account of the widespread use of covenants to create a de facto scheme 
of racial segregation. That was the reality in Shelley: 
The St. Louis Real Estate Exchange openly coordinated the 
city‘s numerous ‗neighborhood improvement associations‘ 
in a widespread pattern of covenanted segregation. Indeed, 
widespreadness was exactly what made RRCs [racial 
restrictive covenants] so pernicious. A handful of small-
scale RRCs could have been insulting and annoying, but 
they could scarcely have had much impact in constricting 
of housing opportunities for African Americans. But 
widespread RRCs threatened to do just that, in a manner 
                                                                                                                     
 143. Again, the analogy to Equal Protection may be helpful. The function of levels of 
scrutiny is to reserve serious review for those inequalities that courts are best positioned to 
remedy relative to legislatures. All laws impose inequalities. Only some of those reveal 
institutional defects in legislatures. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra Subsection II.B.2.a. 
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that was contrary to the ordinary American precepts of 
property law favoring free alienability of real estate.
145
 
The first step of the institutional theory would find no state action 
problem in a world in which racial covenants were isolated occurrences 
and provided no general bar to minorities wishing to live in 
neighborhoods dominated by majorities.
146
 Such isolated covenants 
would not actually coerce individuals into particular channels,
147
 as the 
market would provide choice. And the limited coercion involved in 
individual covenants is governed by touch and concern and other 
doctrines. Therefore, the private act of agreement would have no 
compulsory effect on others, making private Constitutional Law, the 
ordinary law of covenants, the appropriate body of secondary rules to 
govern such acts.
148
 
This, however, was not the situation in Shelley. And although the 
Court failed to grapple with the social reality behind the case, that 
reality would be crucial for a direct application of the institutional 
theory.
149
 The fact that the real-estate market operated in a compulsory 
way, that as to the segregation mandate there was a monopoly of 
practice if not a monopoly of providers, is enough to conclude that the 
private agreements at issue, in the aggregate, had binding effects on 
nonparties. They were legislative in character, and without the agency-
policing provisions of public Constitutional Law, nothing prevented that 
legislation from deviating from what the community requires of public 
                                                                                                                     
 145. Rose, supra note 3, at 195 (footnote omitted) (citing CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS 
ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 106–07 
(1959)). 
 146. It is, however, indeed difficult to imagine a world—with our own history—generally 
free of racial discrimination but in which there are no state or federal laws prohibiting private 
racial discrimination in housing. But it is in such a strange world that Shelley would not have 
been needed.  
 147. Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784–87 (1989) 
(discussing, in the right of privacy context, the difference between laws that remove options and 
laws that coerce by determining courses of conduct). 
 148. Of course, the presence of a state action problem is not the only reason to regulate a 
private transaction. A state‘s judicially enforceable public policy or legislatively enacted statutes 
ought to block even small-scale instances of racial discrimination that have deleterious, if not 
compulsory and therefore public in nature, effects on the public interest. 
 149. In fact, to explain the result, the broader set of facts must have been crucial in the 
Supreme Court‘s indirect application of the same theory. As argued supra, the primary ground 
for state action given, judicial enforcement, does not distinguish Shelley from cases in which 
there is no state action. It is difficult to believe that the Court would have ruled as it did had 
racist covenants not been widespread enough a practice to approach in fact, if not in law, a 
racist-zoning scheme. 
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legislation. In short, the racist covenant scheme created a state action 
problem, unremedied by the state of Missouri.
150
 
The institutional theory thus requires that we move to the second 
step of the analysis: Are the political institutions peculiarly disabled 
from ameliorating the state action problem in this category of cases by 
modifying the applicable private Constitutional Law to incorporate the 
needed public Constitutional Law principles? In answering this, we see 
the important role played by the fact of race discrimination in Shelley. 
Indeed, the second step explains why the protection of unpopular 
speakers and racial minorities intuitively raises the state action question 
where other contents of private rules would scarcely raise an eyebrow.  
The counter-majoritarian nature of courts specially qualifies them to 
act in cases in which discrete and insular minorities will be unable to 
protect themselves within the political institutions.
151
 Because the 
uncorrected state action problem in Shelley was structurally resistant to 
political cure, on account of the relative political powerlessness of those 
harmed by the private zoning scheme, the Court was the institution best 
situated to solve the problem.
152
 Cases like Shelley, which involve 
coercive private laws that single out political minorities for unfavorable 
treatment, reveal institutional failings that justify a preference for 
judicial resolution.
153
 
Before leaving Shelley behind, it is worth observing again that the 
institutional theory would find that most instances of judicial 
enforcement of covenants do not invoke the state action doctrine. In the 
vast majority of cases, the only state action problem a covenant might 
raise is remedied by the touch and concern doctrine and related, but ex 
                                                                                                                     
 150. Note that this analysis applies to any market in which (1) there is a near-uniform rule 
included in all agreements, (2) there is a monopoly of practice, and (3) the market delivers 
something that citizens cannot easily avoid or substitute. Such a market creates a state action 
problem but not necessarily one that should be remedied, under the second step, by courts‘ 
application of public Constitutional Law. 
 151. This is not the only way in which courts may have a clear advantage over other 
governmental institutions. Nor, in fact, do they always have this advantage. But it is the one on 
which I focus for the present. 
 152. I admit to harboring some lingering uncertainty, even under the facts in Shelley, about 
whether the Court would have been the best situated institution to solve the problem if the 
national situation had been a little different. The effect of the state action finding is, perhaps 
unfortunately, to remove regulatory discretion from the political branches. Had the political 
institutional failure been only at the state level with some significant prospect that Congress 
might have or soon develop the capacity to regulate, then there might have been a case for 
judicial restraint. Unfortunately, at the time of Shelley, civil rights legislation was years away. In 
any event, the longtime failure of any political branches in a circumstance paradigmatic of 
political malrepresentation, in my view, strongly supported a state action finding absent clear 
signals that a political solution was imminent. 
 153. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
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post, doctrines intended to deprive poorly governing covenants of 
effect. It should also be obvious that judicial enforcement outside the 
covenant setting is not a trigger for state action. 
Even in cases in which the market settles on some options to the 
exclusion of others, like in the above example of only certain cars or 
newspapers available for purchase, there is almost certainly no state 
action. In many cases, we would not make it past the institutional 
theory‘s first step. A market that makes available only televisions over 
twenty inches is, indeed, reflective of a privately formulated, if in a 
disaggregated manner, rule concerning the appropriate sizes of 
televisions. But this rule does not bind others in any significant way. It 
is difficult, especially these days, to conceive of the unavailability of 
smaller televisions as coercive, as forcing non-consenting others to 
conform to the private rule. Opting out of purchase altogether is 
possible. Most goods are like this, and, indeed, because of their role in 
the receipt of information, televisions are closer to the coercion line 
than most. 
Disaggregated market forces that do create a private, coercive rule of 
the kind that I label a state action problem do not necessarily come 
under public Constitutional Law, as very often the second step renders 
them inappropriate targets for regulation by courts. Even if we 
concluded that television sets, perhaps because of their information-
providing function, were a virtual necessity of citizenship, so that a 
market-produced rule providing restrictions on ownership would be 
necessarily coercive, the question of whether courts should regulate 
such rules with public Constitutional Law would remain to be decided. 
One would need a reason to think that the political branches were 
structurally unable to do so. Unless the rule provides majority benefits 
at minority expense, it is unlikely such a reason exists. 
2.  Marsh 
Marsh v. Alabama arose from a criminal trespass prosecution of a 
Jehovah‘s Witness who continued to distribute religious literature in a 
company-owned town after being asked to leave.
154
 Gulf Shipbuilding 
Corporation owned land that contained ―residential buildings, streets, a 
system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a ‗business block,‘‖ all 
constituting Gulf‘s privately owned town called Chickasaw.155 In the 
Court‘s words, ―the town and its shopping district are accessible to and 
freely used by the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish 
them from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the 
                                                                                                                     
 154. 326 U.S. 501, 502–03 (1946). 
 155. Id. at 502. 
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title to the property belongs to a private corporation.‖156 Unlike an 
ordinary town, however, the private owners of Chickasaw enforced a 
rule prohibiting solicitations of any kind without prior permission, and 
they refused to grant permission to Marsh.
157
 
As the Court pointed out, enforcement in an ordinary, public town of 
such a rule against a religious proselytizer like Marsh would obviously 
be unconstitutional.
158
 As the Court put it, the question, then, was 
whether ―those people who live in or come to Chickasaw [can] be 
denied freedom of press and religion simply because a single company 
has legal title to all the town?‖159 As has been discussed, the Court 
performed a rights-sensitive balancing test to decide that the answer was 
no.
160
 
The institutional theory, however, reveals a more complex legal 
scene. We first must come to grips with what laws are being applied and 
scrutinized. Although she contested her conviction under a criminal 
statute, Marsh‘s argument was not really that the trespass statute itself 
was unconstitutional. The argument, in substance, was that the 
Constitution barred Gulf from formulating and enforcing the private 
rule for granting and revoking licenses on which the trespass statute was 
parasitic.
161
 That manifested, formally, in a challenge to the trespass 
statute as it was applied. But it was Gulf‘s prior restraint, standardless 
licensing, and apparent total bar on Jehovah‘s Witnesses‘ proselytizing 
that were alleged to be unconstitutional. And, indeed, that was what the 
Court analyzed for constitutionality, as was the case for the equivalent, 
but public, rules that were analyzed for constitutionality in cases 
involving ordinary towns.
162
 
Applying the first step of the theory, we ultimately ask whether the 
town‘s rulemaking was poorly governed by private Constitutional Law. 
Whether the town‘s rules amounted to a state action problem depends 
on whether they were essentially obligatory on others, so that their 
binding nature turned on something other than the consent that private 
Constitutional Law assumes. Privately formulated rules for licenses to 
visit private homes and most businesses do not have this quality. 
Visiting a neighbor and shopping in a particular store are almost always 
                                                                                                                     
 156. Id. at 503. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 504–05 (citing, inter alia, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking down 
a scheme requiring permission from the City Manager before distributing literature of any 
kind)). 
 159. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505. 
 160. Id. at 509.  
 161. Id. at 504.  
 162. Id. at 504–05. 
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voluntary in a pure sense. Dislike of the rules of one establishment will 
lead to visiting another.
163
 
An entire town is another matter. Exit is, of course, formally an 
option. But a town, as a collection of residents and businesses, is such 
an interactive locus that avoiding it becomes increasingly difficult with 
its size. As avoidance becomes more difficult, the inference grows that 
appearing there and remaining there are driven by needs that, for many, 
make the terms of the license essentially compulsory. In that case, it 
would be impossible to say that the private lawmakers—the parties to 
the license—made a welfare-enhancing decision by exchanging core 
freedoms for the right to use ordinary town-like resources. 
More importantly, even if many individuals in Chickasaw had truly 
made a Pareto efficient exchange with Gulf, the private rule barred 
others who found the terms of the rule unacceptable. Even though exit 
was an option, the private rule promulgated by Chickasaw and 
cooperated in by town residents and businesspersons had a binding 
effect on outsiders—barring them not just from a particular business 
among many but from an entire region of commerce. The point, in this 
step, is not to make a judgment about whether doing so violates 
fundamental liberties, whatever those might be. Rather, we need only 
establish that the rule had regulatory effects on those who did not make 
it but would nonetheless have to live under it. The licensing rule of an 
individual establishment does not, in general, have this property. But as 
the area covered by the private rule increases, so too does the regulatory 
effect. 
Perhaps a single, private town, especially one composed of like-
minded adherents to an alternative normative regime, does not raise a 
state action problem.
164
 In such a case, the role of consent is far greater, 
in that the more separatist the community, the more its rules can be seen 
to result from private, institutional competence, and the less we should 
be concerned that others will be swept into a regime they had no hand in 
making on account of the economic and geographic power of the town. 
Chickasaw was, as the Supreme Court pointed out, not at all distinct 
from ordinary private towns.
165
 
Moreover, the very idea of a private town was not at all unusual. 
While today company towns seem antiquated,
166
 the Marsh Court noted 
                                                                                                                     
 163. The problem of a uniform rule among disaggregated private entities—a rule barring 
all women, for example, from all of a town‘s shops where no one shop is essential—is taken up 
infra. 
 164. Peñalver, supra note 101, at 1967–71. 
 165. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503. 
 166. But not unheard of. See HARDY GREEN, THE COMPANY TOWN 6 (2010) (identifying 
Columbus, Indiana, and Corning, New York, as company towns that live on, and proclaiming 
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that they were common at the time. ―In the bituminous coal industry 
alone, approximately one-half of the miners in the United States lived in 
company-owned houses in the period from 1922–1923. The percentage 
varied from 9 per cent in Illinois and Indiana and 64 per cent in 
Kentucky, to almost 80 per cent in West Virginia.‖167 If there were 
near-uniform rules across many of these towns, it would support the 
finding of a state action problem, as the uniformity of covenant practice 
did in Shelley. Here, though, it would suffice to find a state action 
problem if there were a single, company-owned town sufficiently 
integrated into (even if not the whole of) the local economy, so that 
avoidance was a significant burden. 
As to the second step, the above discussion is highly relevant. Recall 
that we ask in this step whether the Court should undertake what ought 
to be a highly unusual step. Should it apply the public Constitution to 
private conduct, breaking with the formal identification theory? The 
institutional theory argues that it should only do so when the Court is far 
better suited, at the margin, to solve a state action problem than other 
institutions are. The most common, though possibly not the only, reason 
the Court might be best suited to solve such a problem is that the private 
rule disadvantages a group that lacks political power to protect itself in 
other areas of government.
168
 
Marsh, like Shelley, does seem to be a case involving a private rule 
presenting a state action problem that discriminates against political 
minorities. It is a situation in which it might be difficult for other 
institutions to introduce ameliorating public-law-inspired secondary 
rules into the governing private Constitutional Law. Perhaps that is 
enough, but perhaps in exercising this blunt and unusual authority, the 
Court could look more deeply into the likelihood that the state would 
better represent minority interests in private towns in the future. Is there 
already an extensive regulation of such towns, in which speaker 
protection is a lacuna? And if so, are there regulations that could lead us 
to believe that the lack of protection here is unintentional, owing to lack 
of foresight? These sorts of questions attempt to gauge the need for 
unusual federal court intervention. 
In Marsh, there is at least some indication that the Court recognized 
that the state had no intention of wielding any unusual regulatory 
authority: ―The State urges in effect that the corporation‘s right to 
control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with the right of a 
                                                                                                                     
corporate campuses like Pepsico‘s Purchase, New York, and Google‘s Googleplex in Mountain 
View, California, to be examples of a new form of company town). 
 167. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508 n.5. 
 168. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
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homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests.‖169 In the end, 
Alabama‘s apparent lack of interest in solving the state action problem 
in Marsh and the Court‘s apparent concern that privately owned towns 
were a significant feature of the cultural landscape, primarily populated 
by miners and workers of modest means, probably justified its view that 
it had an institutional advantage in setting second-principle baselines—
here, prohibiting private rules discriminating against speakers. 
3.  Other Cases 
In Terry v. Adams, a private group in Texas, the Jaybird Democrats, 
held private elections restricted to whites.
170
 Its membership included, 
by definition, all white voters in the county.
171
 Candidates ran within the 
organization, and victorious candidates would then run unopposed in 
the Democratic primary, in which the losers of the private primary did 
not appear.
172
 The effect was to create an all-white primary.
173
 The 
Supreme Court found the procedure unconstitutional under the Fifteenth 
Amendment, holding that ―[t]he Jaybird primary has become an integral 
part, indeed the only effective part, of the elective process that 
determines who shall rule and govern in the county‖ and that ―[t]he 
effect of the whole procedure . . . is to do precisely that which the 
Fifteenth Amendment forbids.‖174 
The institutional theory handles the case in a straightforward 
manner. The rules of the Jaybird Party, though formally private, were 
binding on nonmembers, namely nonwhite voters. These rules, 
therefore, created an obvious state action problem. Further, under step 
two, the need for federal court intervention could not have been plainer. 
We have in Terry an attempt at racial discrimination in elective office, 
in a situation in which the suspicion is high that the state has willfully 
decided not to regulate on its own and in which the minority groups 
harmed by the private rule lack the political representation that could 
effectively win regulation. 
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison,
175
 a private electricity company 
had a state-sanctioned monopoly on service to a particular area of 
Pennsylvania.
176
 Because of the nature of the service it provided, it was 
heavily regulated by the state. The plaintiff alleged that the company 
                                                                                                                     
 169. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505–06. 
 170. 345 U.S. 461, 462–63 (1953). 
 171. Id. at 463.  
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 469–70. 
 175. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
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had turned off her electric service without due process of law.
176
 
Asserting that the company‘s termination of her service was state 
action, she sought to challenge the termination rules under the more 
aggressive second-principle derived rules of due process instead of the 
second-principle derived rules of unconscionability (and related 
doctrines).
177
 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a Court that had passed the high-water 
marks of state action reached in cases like Shelley, Marsh, and Terry, 
disclaimed reliance on the asserted monopoly status of the utility or of 
its connection with the public interest.
178
 Rather, looking for a concrete 
connection between formal state officials and the conduct in the case, 
the Court found nothing ―to connect the State of Pennsylvania with 
respondent‘s action so as to make the latter‘s conduct attributable to the 
State.‖179 
Jackson is interesting, because rules promulgated by a monopoly 
provider of electricity surely present state action problems. Both the 
majority and some justices in dissent failed to appreciate the quality of 
the argument that electricity is an ―essential public service.‖180 That 
description of electrical service is another way of observing that 
citizens, in the modern day, cannot realistically opt out of procuring it. 
And if the provider is a monopoly, so that shopping for service involves 
moving one‘s abode, then the provider‘s privately created rules will not 
be well-governed by private Constitutional Law that assumes consent. 
And, indeed, heavy state regulation of utilities is intended to be 
responsive to this state action problem. 
The Jackson case is difficult because of the second step. On the one 
hand, lax termination procedures that affect mainly customers who have 
trouble paying their bills would seem to be the sort of rules that might 
                                                                                                                     
 176. Id. 
 176. Id. at 348. 
 177. See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text. 
 178. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351–53. 
 179. Id. at 358. 
 180. See, e.g., id. at 353 (rejecting ―the contention that the furnishing of utility services is 
either a state function or a municipal duty‖); id. at 371 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recognizing the 
functional importance of how essential a service is but focusing on traditional association with 
government). The narrow view, the ―find the state‖ view, of essential public services arises 
because of the lack of a second step in the state action analysis. Justice Marshall speculated that 
the majority‘s reluctance to apply due process to the company was ―likely guided in part by its 
reluctance to impose on a utility company burdens that might ultimately hurt consumers more 
than they would help them.‖ Id. at 373. This, he suggested, was owing to the expense of 
hearings and the like. Id. The two-step institutional theory would recognize situations in which a 
superficially unresolved state action problem was in fact a best-interests, legislative solution to 
the problem. Where it is not clear that courts are needed to resolve such problems, they should 
leave them for better equipped political institutions. 
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not receive enough political attention to be well-regulated. On the other 
hand, there were in fact state efforts to solve these problems, as 
reflected by the extensive regulatory environment in which the company 
operated.
181
 The very reasons Justice Douglas cited to support the 
presence of state action, namely the degree of the state‘s involvement in 
requiring the company‘s rules to include an obligation to provide 
reasonable notice, are reasons to suspect that federal court involvement 
may be inappropriate.
182
 Where the state is already involved in 
importing public constitutional principles into the secondary law 
governing private parties, courts should be leery of displacing that role, 
absent signals that the state is committed, because of capture or 
incapacity, to poor governance. Critical to deciding whether this is the 
case might be direct evidence of private capture, evidence of other areas 
within the regulations that irrationally disfavor poorer residents, or even 
individual regulations so deficient that they are difficult to explain 
without reference to institutional bias.
183
 
Justice Marshall suggested that the problem of courts‘ imposing due 
process rules on private parties, displacing private preferences for 
public conceptions of fairness between the parties, could be ameliorated 
by ―allowing various private institutions the flexibility to select 
procedures that fit their particular needs.‖184 In areas in which the 
political institutions are not peculiarly disabled from doing so, such 
flexibility in regulations responsive to state action problems could well 
come about. Importantly, the design of such means is almost certainly 
better produced administratively or legislatively (or even by common 
law courts adopting, instead of due process explicitly, modestly 
heightened unconscionability standards for certain classes of cases) than 
by federal courts. While Justice Marshall argued that the Court‘s finding 
state action would not necessarily mean an all-or-nothing application of 
state-like procedural rules, his argument also tends to promote the 
relative desirability of administrative rather than judicial regulation.
185
 
                                                                                                                     
 181. Id. at 357 (―The nature of governmental regulation of private utilities is such that a 
utility may frequently be required by the state regulatory scheme to obtain approval for practices 
a business regulated in less detail would be free to institute without any approval from a 
regulatory body.‖). 
 182. Id. at 361–62 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 183. I should also emphasize that the state‘s own secondary regulations are themselves 
subject to constitutional review. To the extent that they mandate procedures that are deficient, 
there is no question of state action standing in the way. 
 184. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 372 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 185. See, e.g., Int‘l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (―Courts would be powerless to prescribe the detailed regulations essential to full 
enjoyment of the rights conferred or to introduce the machinery required for enforcement of 
such regulations.‖). 
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4.  Private Action Problems 
The institutional approach to state action reorients the inquiry from 
finding an exception to private actor immunity to the Constitution to 
responding to the Categorization Problem of public and private 
lawmakers. Once this move is made, it is obvious to ask whether the 
categorization can be problematic in the other direction. Can public 
Constitutional Law be a poor match for a formally public entity that, as 
to particular actions, functionally resembles a private entity?  
Taking a cue from the methods we used to identify instances of 
private lawmaking that are poorly governed by private Constitutional 
Law, mainly looking for laws that had some de facto binding effect on 
non-consenting parties, we might ask whether there are public officials 
whose rulemaking primarily affects a governmental interest in a way 
that we desire to be self-interested. The prevailing characteristic of 
private lawmaking as self-interested is what led us to insist on consent 
as, in general, a primary criterion to gauge the appropriateness of the 
usual private Constitutional Law regime. Public Constitutional Law, in 
contrast, is generally premised on ensuring good agency for broader 
public interests. 
A search for situations in which, contra the usual, self-interest in 
relation to a citizen is an appropriate governmental objective leads us to 
the case of public employee speech. Government entities, of course, 
have very limited authority to impose consequences on speech by 
private persons. But government entities are also expected to be 
effective, and their interest in running an office efficiently is similar to 
that of a private employer. As the Supreme Court put it in Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, ―Government employers, like private employers, need a 
significant degree of control over their employees‘ words and actions; 
without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of 
public services.‖186 In other words, ordinary public Constitutional Law 
would do a poor job regulating government in its role as employer, in 
which it should pursue, to some extent, self-interested policies.
187
  
                                                                                                                     
 186. 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). See also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) 
(plurality opinion) (―[T]he government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the 
government as sovereign.‖). 
 187. See, e.g., Waters, 511 U.S. at 674–75 (―Rather, the extra power the government has in 
this area comes from the nature of the government‘s mission as employer. Government agencies 
are charged by law with doing particular tasks. Agencies hire employees to help do those tasks 
as effectively and efficiently as possible. When someone who is paid a salary so that she will 
contribute to an agency‘s effective operation begins to do or say things that detract from the 
agency‘s effective operation, the government employer must have some power to restrain her. 
The reason [a] governor may . . . fire [a] deputy is not that this dismissal would somehow be 
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. It is that the governor and the governor‘s 
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In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court described the public 
employee speech problem as involving ―a balance between the interests 
of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.‖188 
It is no accident that this reminds us of Marsh, in which the Court 
understood itself as balancing the rights of the landowner against the 
speech rights of Marsh. And it is also no accident that the Court has at 
times recast, for the better, the nature of the balance as one more 
resembling the concerns of the institutional theory—that between the 
government‘s responsibilities as sovereign and those as employer.189 
The employee speech cases establish that the Court has not applied a 
simple, formal identification theory on this side of the Constitutional 
Law axis either. Instead it has (1) identified a private action problem 
with the application of ordinary public Constitutional Law to employee 
speech cases, and (2) borrowed principles of private Constitutional Law 
to correct the problem. This borrowing consists of allowing what 
amounts to ―for cause‖ termination when the public employee‘s speech 
disrupts the efficiency of the government office.
190
 
There is much more to examine on this side of the lawmaking 
Categorization Problem. Just as the various state action approaches I 
examined and rejected above have valuable intuitions,
191
 so too might 
they provide intuitions for finding and repairing private action 
problems. 
For example, is there a ―weakness theory‖ analogous to the intuition 
animating the power theory? Where the government‘s coercive capacity 
is weak, that is, where it is unusually similar to that of ordinary market 
actors, the application of public Constitutional Law lacks its ordinary 
justification.
192
 If the government is just another employer in a 
competitive labor market, is buying and selling in the market like 
ordinary market actors,
193
 has as its mission to serve an individual‘s 
                                                                                                                     
staff have a job to do, and the governor justifiably feels that a quieter subordinate would allow 
them to do this job more effectively.‖). 
 188. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 189. See, e.g., Waters, 511 U.S. at 675 (explaining that the fact that it is acting as an 
employer permits a governmental entity to regulate in the name of efficiency). 
 190. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) (―While as a matter of good 
judgment, public officials should be receptive to constructive criticism offered by their 
employees, the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for 
employee complaints over internal office affairs.‖). 
 191. See supra Section III.A. 
 192. See Strauss, supra note 105, at 416 (arguing that when the government is subject to 
ordinary market forces it should be subject to less stringent constitutional scrutiny). 
 193. The private action problem sheds light on the market-participant exception to the 
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private purpose,
194
 or is otherwise appropriately acting as a self-
interested entity,
195
 courts should and do import private secondary rules 
to displace more searching public rules. 
I do not attempt to give a full account of private action problems in 
this Article. But these examples show how difficult cases, the odd 
outcroppings, can be understood better with a full appreciation of law‘s 
public–private bedrock.  
CONCLUSION 
The institutional perspective on state action provides a firm 
theoretical foundation for the doctrine. It reveals that the state action 
question is found in areas of law other than the body of recognized state 
action cases. It explains the political and common law regulation of 
private conduct with public-type norms. It explains the focus in state 
action cases on discrete and insular minorities. It connects the rather 
odd but important smattering of state action cases with the deeper 
structure of legal systems. While it does not render every state action 
question easy, it at least has the virtue of showing why they are hard. 
State action, conversely, demonstrates the importance of 
apprehending law‘s public–private structure. The structural theory, by 
focusing on the fundamental division between collective and individual 
action, helps reduce a great many seemingly unrelated substantive 
questions to different aspects of the same underlying institutional 
question. For this reason, the light it shines on state action can similarly 
illuminate other areas of our law. Because the structural theory is 
general, applicable to any collective, and because the institutional state 
action theory is cast in terms of the structural theory, we now have the 
                                                                                                                     
Dormant Commerce Clause cases. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 685 (1999) (―[T]he prospect that States will use custom 
duties, exclusionary trade regulations, and other exercises of governmental power . . . to favor 
their own citizens . . . is entirely absent where the States are buying and selling in the market.‖); 
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436, 446 (1980) (upholding South Dakota‘s decision to sell 
the product of a state cement plant on a priority basis to South Dakota citizens and 
distinguishing ―between States as market participants and States as market regulators‖). 
 194. See, e.g., Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318–19 (1981) (holding that state-
employed public defender was not subject to constitutional torts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as the 
defender serves ―essentially a private function‖ of advancing his or her client‘s interests). 
 195. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 370 (1981) (refusing to apply the one person, 
one vote rule of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), to an Agricultural Improvement and 
Power District). The Court in Ball decided, based on the limited powers and mandate of the 
District, that the nonvoting members and the District—despite its formal, public status—had a 
consumer–business relationship rather than a citizen–sovereign one. ―The functions of the 
[District] are therefore of the narrow, special sort which justifies a departure from the popular-
election requirement of the Reynolds case.‖ Id. 
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tools to look for state action problems in other types of legal systems. 
For example, in international law, is there a state action theory that 
should be applicable to treaties, or other rules made by the private 
entities (states, here) within the system that raise state action problems? 
I have endeavored to use the tools of the structure theory to develop 
a fuller picture of the state action problem. This is only a beginning, 
both to filling in that picture and to developing the public–private theory 
of legal systems. 
59
Turner: State Action Problems
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
340 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
 
60
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss1/6
